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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY  
ON THE EXPERIENCE OF PRIVATIZATION IN UK, KOREA AND JAPAN  
AND IMPLICATIONS TO CHINA SOES REFORM 
 
 
By 
 
Xuan Li 
 
 
 
This paper, first, reviews the theoretical framework of privatization with special concern 
over property rights and competitive nature of the market.  It examines economic 
implication of property rights and suggests different policy implications under different 
market conditions.  Through empirical studies of privatization in United Kingdom (UK), 
Japan, and Korea, it illustrates the gains from privatization.  It also stresses the lessons 
learnt for future privatization process and policies.  In addition, it reviews the recent 
Chinese reform programs including the ones of the state-owned-enterprises (SOE) and the 
financial sector.  This paper argues that, without proper transfer of property rights, 
inefficiencies will remain and Chinese SOEs will continue to be a heavy burden on the 
national economy.  Lastly, some policy suggestions for the future reform on the Chinese 
SOEs will be discussed.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
During the course of 1980s and 1990s, we have witnessed an incredible growth in the sales of 
previously state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to private investors.  This worldwide phenomenon 
marked a dramatic reversal in public policy toward the state’s role in business.  The magnitude of 
this economic phenomenon is overwhelming.  Nearly 100 countries have launched ambitious 
programs to privatize their state-owned enterprises.  
This paper reviews the theoretical framework of privatization with special concern over property 
rights and competitive nature of the market.  It examines economic implication of property rights 
and suggests different policy implications under different market conditions.  Through empirical 
studies of privatization in UK, Japan, and Korea, the paper illustrates the benefit and gains from 
privatization.  It also stresses the lessons learnt for future privatization process and policies.  In 
addition, it reviews the recent Chinese reform programs including those of the state-owned-
enterprises and the financial sector.   
Chapter I develops a theoretical framework to explain the following questions: Why are 
governments privatizing?  Does property right affect economic performance? Does privatization 
guarantee improved economic efficiency?  Under what conditions is privatization ineffective in 
improving efficiency?  This framework would allow us to: (1) highlight the impact of 
privatization on efficiency under perfectly competitive markets; and (2) illustrate the importance 
of regulation to guarantee improved efficiency, under imperfect markets.   
The conclusion of this chapter indicates that the allocation of property rights does, in fact, play a 
2 
 
role in improving efficiency.  The allocation of property rights determines the objectives of the 
“owners” of a firm and systems of monitoring managerial performance.  Public and private 
ownership differs in both respects, as a result, changes in property rights will materially affect 
the incentive structures, and hence the behavior of management.  This result yields some policy 
implications concerning the relationship between transfer of property rights by privatization and 
efficiency improvement as well as the state’s use of monopoly power.  In addition, analysis of the 
imperfect market conditions also yields important policy implications on monopoly regulation. 
Chapter II introduces experiences of privatization in three selected countries ,  i.e. United 
Kingdom (UK), Japan and Korea, which are at different stage of privatization process and whose 
experience could serve as useful references for other countries.  Considering the economical        
relationship and geographical location, privatization process in Japan and Korea’s development 
will provide special insights for their neighboring country, China. In each case, the main 
characteristics of the country and industries concerned are outlined first before evaluating the 
policy changes that have been implemented in these countries.  The common themes will serve 
to link the individual case studies with the theoretical perspectives developed throughout this 
chapter. 
In the case of UK, its experience shows that privatization has generally improved consumer 
welfare via a combination of higher quality and quantity of output and lower prices.  UK is 
considered a pioneer in introducing the price cap regulation to privatize the utility industry.   The 
RPI-X method has been examined to present its advanced application through UK Water’s two-
stage privatization process.   
In the case study of Japan, two privatization cases are highlighted: Japan National Railways and 
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation.  Increased competition after privatization 
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brought about price reduction and better services. However, there still remained many unsolved 
issues, including the heavy debt burden of privatized SOEs and lack of efficiency improvement 
of NTT after privatization. 
Korea has dedicated itself to privatization for more than 20 years.  In the early stage, the 
privatization efforts did not proceed smoothly due to underdeveloped capital market and lack of 
deregulation. More recently, partly owing to the financial crisis, Korea accelerated privatization 
process that comprehensively changed the Korea’s institutional environment and completed the 
privatization of Korea Telecom (KT), the first of its kind on privatization.  The case of KT 
illustrates that, without proper deregulation, privatization is unlikely to successfully promote 
increased competition. 
Chapter II concludes by drawing privatization experience of the three selected countries to give 
an overall assessment of the privatization program.  It stresses the lessons derived from the case 
studies, including the implementation of specific policy measures aimed to increase effective 
competition and to improve the effectiveness of regulatory policies designed to contain 
monopoly power. 
Chapter III analyzes the recent SOEs reforms that have taken place in China since 1998 as 
China is moving toward a more market-based economy.  This chapter illustrates that, despite 
ambitious new round of reforms, inefficiencies will continue to persist in the SOEs unless the 
ownership of SOEs is transferred.  The suggestions for China’s future privatization efforts 
include: 1) privatize all the SOEs which have are not policy-oriented, 2) for natural monopolies, 
maintain regulation to restrict their influence and power in market; 3) implement RPI-X 
regulation for utility industry privatization; 4) carefully choose a suitable time of business cycles 
and speed when privatizing SOEs, to minimize the possible side effects such as insolvent debt 
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burdens and sudden and large scale unemployment; and 5) actively attracting external investors 
for the newly corporatized SOEs. 
One of the other critical issues in China is its financial sector reform.  There is an urgent need for 
the Chinese government to undertake more comprehensive and drastic steps to restructure wholly 
state-owned commercial banks (WSCBs). These steps should include properly sequenced 
deregulations on interest rates and on expansion of the scope of business and on entry of new 
banks.  These measures would encourage commercial banks to become more viable and 
commercial-oriented and, as such, to provide sound financial framework for further SOE reforms. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
1.1. Rationales for Privatization  
Privatization refers to the sale of SOEs or their assets to private investors.  There are many 
rationales for such privatization programs: promotion of efficiency, gaining political support, 
increasing profitability, among others.  Commonly stated objectives can be generally categorized 
as follows1: 
1.1.1. Efficiency  
Promotion of efficiency can be divided into two subcategories, i.e. the efficiency of the market or 
the efficiency of the enterprise itself. 
A. Efficiency of the Market 
When pursuing privatization, governments usually expect that the privatization programs would 
achieve the following goals related to efficiency of the market: 1) Encourage new private 
enterprise formation and expansion of the private sector in general; 2) Promote macroeconomic 
or sectoral efficiency and competitiveness; 3) Foster economic flexibility and eliminate 
rigidities; 4) Promote competition, particularly by abolishing monopolies; 5) Establish or 
                                                 
1 Kagami, Mitsuhiro and Masatsugu Tsuji, Privatization, Deregulation and Economic Efficiency, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2000: 108 
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develop efficient capital markets, allowing better capture and mobilization of domestic savings; 
6) Improve access to foreign markets for domestic products; 7) Promote domestic investments; 
and 8) Promote integration of the domestic economy into the world economy. 
B. Efficiency of the Enterprise 
Efficiency of the enterprise includes: 1) Improve internal management and production efficiency 
and its domestic and international competitiveness; 2) Introduce new technologies and promote 
innovation; 3) Upgrade plant and equipment; 4) Increase productivity, including optimal 
utilization of industrial plant capacity; 5) Improve the quality of the goods and services 
produced; and 6) Introduce new management methods. 
1.1.2. Political Goals 
Political goals include: 1) Reduce the government’s share in the ownership of market assets; 2) 
Reduce the size of the government by reallocating the production tasks that can be handled by 
the private sector; 3) Redefine the role of the government in national economy, by focusing more 
on its role as a facilitator, and thereby creating an environment more favorable to private 
economic activities; and 4) Reduce the opportunities for corruption and misuse of public 
property by government officials and SOE managers. 
1.1.3. Budgetary and Fiscal Goals 
Budgetary and fiscal goals includes: 1) Maximize net privatization receipts in order to fund 
government expenditures, reduce taxation, trim the public sector deficit, or pay off public debt; 
2) Reduce the financial drain of the SOEs on the state (in the form of subsidies, unpaid taxes, 
loan arrears, guarantees given, etc.); 3) Mobilize private investments for greater capital 
mobilization; 4) Generate new sources of tax revenue; and 5) Limit the future risk of demands on 
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the budget inherent in state ownership of businesses, including the need to provide capital for 
their expansion or to rescue them when they are in financial trouble. 
 
1.2. Theoretical Analysis of Privatization 
Among the goals enumerated above, the most important goal of privatization is to improve 
efficiency, including efficiency of the market and that of the enterprise.  Hence, the first question 
to be addressed is whether privatization effectively improves economic efficiency in general, 
through the function of property rights in relation to the market performance.  Thereafter, the 
analysis will be focused on the conditions under which privatization could succeed.   
1.2.1. Property Rights and Efficiency 
As mentioned earlier, privatization refers to the divestment of ownership of SOEs.  Privatization 
exploits the merits of market solutions that clarify the ownership of the assets.  Property rights 
clearly define the range of individual ownership.  Thus, it is possible to determine the function of 
privatization through the function of property rights.  Through the analysis of the relationship 
between property rights and efficiency, a clearer picture of the impact of privatization on 
efficiency can be established.  When the market is under perfect competition, private ownership 
will lead to a more efficient and higher productive use of resources than public ownership.  Our 
analysis will first cover the issues under perfect market before addressing the situation of 
imperfect market later in the next section. 
A. Characteristics of Property Rights 
The essential characteristics of private property rights are: 1) Exclusiveness in the right of use; 
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and 2) Transferability.2 It is important to note that these characteristics are polar opposites.  
Exclusiveness enables an individual to exercise one’s private property rights – one can exclude 
others from using the property without permission. Transferability means that private ownership 
can be traded. This results in allocative efficiency because the one who is willing to pay the 
highest price will get the property.  It is the ability to buy and sell ownership of the rights of 
private firms that generates continuous pressure for productive efficiency. 3 
Property rights that cannot be traded may generate inefficiency.  Such property rights block the 
individuals who can maximize the value of the resource from getting that asset.  What causes the 
inefficiency of common ownership is not that many individuals own it but that those individuals 
cannot trade their rights.  In other words, those who are part of common ownership are not “real 
owners” but are rather temporary managers.  If property rights cannot be traded, individuals have 
an incentive to cash in on them during their tenure as owners.  They are, therefore, not 
encouraged to take a long-term view and will tend to push for short-run benefit maximization.  
 B. Public Property Rights Problem 
When a resource is not owned by anyone, it tends to be over-exploited.  The oceans and the 
atmosphere are examples of lack of ownership causing people to treat a valuable resource as if it 
were a free good.  The common property right has similar effects.  Such a right is non-exclusive 
in the sense that no individual who is a member of the relevant social group can be excluded 
from using the resource in question.  These rights, when combined with narrow individual self-
interest, lead to economics waste and degradation in the value and quality of the resource. 
Common property resources are over-utilized because each individual bears the full gain from 
                                                 
2 Coase, R.H. The Problem of Social Cost, Journal of Law and Economics, 3 I, 1960 
3 Wright, Vincent and Luisa Perrotti, Privatization and Public Policy, Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 
2000:219 
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his use of the resources but only a fraction of the costs that this use imposes on others.  Hardin’s 
“tragedy of commons”4 illustrates this general phenomenon:  
The herdsman using the village commons treats it as if it were a free good. 
Individually each herdsman appropriates the full gain from each additional cow 
he puts on the commons but bears only a fraction of the costs caused by the 
resulting overgrazing.  It is thus rational for each herdsman to continue adding 
more cows to the commons and to ignore the costs that this inflicts on others: 
with all herdsmen acting in this way the ruin of the commons is the destination 
to which all men rush.  
This result arises because the commons is collectively owned. It is treated as a free, unpriced 
resource and hence use of the resource is not rationed as it would be if the herdsmen had to pay 
for grazing their cattle.  The herdsmen’s behavior is rational in the sense that they are 
maximizing their private gains and losses from the use of the commons.  But because of a 
defective institutional structure, aggregate wealth is diminished. 
The commons problem can be generalized to all resources, which are not owned or collectively 
owned by a large number of individuals who cannot sell or trade their rights.  The fish in the sea 
are not owned and the only way ownership rights can be asserted is by capturing them.  Again, 
no single fisherman can benefit from conserving the stock of fish.  A fisherman who limits 
today’s catch finds that other fishermen have already caught all the fish.  The incentive on each 
fisherman is to catch as many fish as soon as possible.  When all behave in this way the 
economic value of the fishing grounds is dissipated by over fishing, excessive catches and 
possibly the extinction of the species.  In short, generally speaking, competition without private 
                                                 
4 G.Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, Science, I 62, 1968: 1243 
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property rights is inefficient.   
What distinguished public and private enterprises is the fact that public assets are not “owned” 
since they cannot effectively be transferred.  This lack of transferability means that decisions 
taken by public bureaucrats and employees do not readily translate into changes in the market 
price of the firm’s assets, and the ‘owners” have little incentive to monitor public managers’ and 
employees’ behavior.  In other words, there is agency problem.  The agent is not working in the 
best interest of the principal.   
1.2.2. Principal-agent Conflict of Interest 
Principal-agent theory is concerned with the problem of information and incentives.  When 
attempting to achieve its goals, the principal is handicapped by lack of certain information, 
which only the management knows precisely.  Efforts of the managers may be unobservable and 
therefore impossible to monitor.  Since the principal cannot directly observe the activities of the 
management, one cannot directly influence the behavior of the manager.  The management has 
its own objectives; hence it may choose an effort level that is not efficient. 5 
The decisive difference in informational status of the private principal and the public principal 
lies in the efficiency.  The private principal has ex ante knowledge of the actual value.  This 
means that the private principal is able to draw correct information about the actual value form 
some outside source, not from the agent.  The public principal does not know the actual value 
when signing the contract and the only information about the actual value he can receive comes 
form the agent. 
Private property rights mean participation of self-interested monitors.  Self-interested monitors 
                                                 
5 John Vickers and George Yarrow, Privatization:  An Economic Analysis, the MIT Press, 1988: 9 
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reduce the social cost of monitoring.  The owners of a private firm are interested in profit.  The 
manager of the private firm knows this goal; there is no uncertainty about weights that should be 
given to various other objectives.  They reduce the social cost of monitoring.  Private ownership 
plus remuneration by variable residual claims creates powerful incentives and a self-enforcing 
system of monitoring of costs and performance. 
If the agent, management, does not act in the best interests of the principal, shareholders, the 
need to monitor performance and to control public management becomes greater.  In the private 
sector, an important agency relationship exists between shareholders (principals) and directors 
(agents).  At its simplest, the shareholders own the enterprise and appoint directors to manage it 
on their behalf.  The implications of this relationship for efficiency in the private sector are 
explored below (Table 1).  In the public sector, by contrast, the principal-agent relationship is 
more complex because the ultimate owners of state assets, the principals, are public.  Between 
the public and the managers of the assets (the boards of state industries) exist layers of agencies.  
The greater complexity of the agency relationship is also illustrated in the table below.  The 
existence of layer of agents provides more room to distort the information flow between 
principals and resource managers.  So privatization can be viewed as changing the nature of the 
principal-agent relationship to reduce this scope and therefore facilitate the introduction of more 
effective incentive systems that bind agents to the principals’ goals. 6 
 
 
 
                                                 
6  Stephen Martinand David Parker, The Impact of Privatization, Ownership and Corporate 
Performance in the UK, TJ International Ltd, 1997:13 
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Table 1: Flow of Information Between Principal and Agent in Public and Private Sectors 
Private ownership Public ownership 
Public 
 
Tiers of agents 
 
Elected representatives 
 
Government ministers and “sponsoring”
departments 
Shareholders 
 
Agent:  Directors 
 
 
Boards of nationalized industries 
1.2.3. Natural Monopoly and Privatization 
The above analysis is based on perfect competition under standard neo-classical theory, but the 
government should also consider the situation of imperfect competition. This is particularly the 
case with firms that operate in industries with natural monopoly characteristics.  Under such 
condition, the government should play some role to regulate and control when privatizing the 
enterprises.  Thus, interventions and regulations are necessary. 
Under imperfect competition, market mechanism does not always produce the Pareto-optimal 
results.  As mentioned earlier, a particularly troublesome deviation from the perfectly 
competitive model is the widespread existence of increasing returns to scale, giving rise to the 
emergence of natural monopolies.  The existence of natural monopolies is one of the standard 
economic arguments used in favor of public enterprises, to capture the benefits of scale 
economies for the general public rather than for the owners.  
Natural monopoly means industries where cost conditions are such that it would be inefficient to 
have more than one or a very small number of suppliers.  It tends to be found where the 
production technology requires a high fixed cost and a much smaller variable cost so that one 
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firm can produce the industry’s output more cheaply than many smaller firms.  The distribution 
networks (utilities industries) in the electricity, gas, and water industries are example of natural 
monopolies.   
A private monopolist has all property rights but the use of the property  can be  far from efficient.  
When there is little competition, the company has the ability to maximize the wealth of their 
shareholders at the expense of the consumers.  This militates against the allocation of the 
resources to their highest valued users.  In the absence of perfect market competition, private 
property rights have to be supplemented by regulation to ensure that consumers are protected and 
that the firm does not exercise its market power to exploit consumers and inhibit new 
competition from arising.  Where the production technology precludes competition in the market, 
the monopolist must be restricted from abusing its market power when it is converted into a 
private enterprise.   
In order to control monopoly power, the government can break up the monopoly firms, 
encourage other firms to compete with them, and set up regulatory mechanisms.   
Typically a regulatory system includes: an operating license for the company, which sets out its 
public service obligations in detail; a pricing formula to determine maximum prices (and 
therefore indirectly maximum profits); and a regulatory office headed by a director general.  The 
regulatory office polices the license, regulates market entry and negotiates and monitors and 
pricing formula and service standards.  
Price cap and rate-of-return are the main types of regulations on natural monopolies to improve 
their efficiency.7  These two tools are widely applied in utilities industry around the world with 
                                                 
7 Price Caps, Rate-of-Return Regulation, and the Cost of Capital Private Sector, the World Bank, 
1996 
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varying results.  They require sophisticated implementation, continual adjustment to new market 
problems by the government.  The details of application of these methods are provided in the 
next chapter.  There are also a number of other regulatory issues on privatization that authorities 
have to face. 
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CHAPTER II  
PRIVATIZATION IN UK, JAPAN, AND KOREA 
 
2.1. UK Privatization 
UK started its privatization programs in 1979.  Thus it has a long history of privatization with 
rich experience and many implications for future privatization efforts in other countries.  UK 
was the first country to start mass privatization, selling more than 90 percent of its total public 
enterprises.  It was very successful in carrying out the privatization programs and also in 
achieving desired results.  
2.1.1. UK Country Survey 
A. Initial Conditions 
During the Conservative administrations of Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) and John Major 
(1990-1997), large-scale privatization of many of public enterprises took place. In 1979, UK 
public enterprises accounted for 8% of employment, 10% of output and 16% of total gross 
domestic fixed capital formation.  However, they were regarded to be largely inefficient.  The 
productivity growth of SOEs in terms of output per head from 1951 to 1973 was 3% in private 
manufacturing and 2.7% in public enterprises, while from 1973 to 1985 the figures were 2.3% 
and 2.1% respectively.  In contrast, output per head in 1982 in US railways was 4 times that of 
the UK, US coal 9 times more efficient, and US electricity and gas 3.5% times higher, with an 
16 
 
average of 2.8 times higher for the whole of manufacturing. 8 
B. Process and Contents 
The privatization process in UK was strongly supported by four successive Conservative 
administrations.  The primary characteristic of UK government policy of privatization is the 
introduction of market incentives into industries where state ownership and legislation had 
limited private ownership and new entry.  
During the first Conservative administration (1979-1983), only companies which were already 
listed on the stock exchange or which operated in competitive markets were privatized.  
During the second administration (1983-1987), the privatization of major utilities began with 
the privatization of British Telecom in 1984, followed by the British Gas, the world largest 
public offer for sale.  During the third Conservative administration (1987-1992), privatization 
occurred in water and electricity industries.  The fourth Conservative administration (1992-
1997) pushed through the privatization of companies previously thought to be not salable: 
British Coal, British Energy and the rail industry.  For the timetable of UK privatization from 
1979 to 1996, refer to Table 2 below.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8Kagami, Mitsuhiro and Masatsugu Tsuji, Privatization, Deregulation and Economic Efficiency, 
Edward   Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2000: 105 
9 Kagami, Mitsuhiro and Masatsugu Tsuji, Privatization, Deregulation and Economic Efficiency, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2000: 106-108 
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Table 2:  UK Privatization via Public Offer of Shares, 1979-1996 
 
Number Industry 
Date of 
offer %Sold Number Industry 
Date of 
offer %Sold 
1 
British 
Petroleum 1979.10. 5.2 20 South West Water 1989.12. 97.4 
  1983.9. 7.2 21 Thames Water 1989.12. 97.4 
  1987.11. 36.8 22 Welsh Water 1989.12. 98.4 
2 
British 
Aerospace 1981.2. 51.6 23 Wessex Water 1989.12. 98.4 
  1985.5. 59 24 Yorkshire Water 1989.12. 97.8 
3 Cable&Wireless 1981.1. 49.4 25 Eastern Electricity 1990.12. 97.6 
  1983 .12 22.3 26 East Midlands Electricity 1990.12. 97.5 
  1985.12. 31.1 27 London Electricity 1990.12. 97.5 
4 Britoil 1982 .11. 51 28 Manweb 1990.12. 97.5 
  1985.8. 49 29 Midlands Electricity 1990.12. 97.7 
5 
Amersham 
International 1982.2. 100 30 Northern Electric 1990.12. 97.5 
6 
Associated 
British Port 
Holdings 1983.2. 51.5 31 Norweb 1990.12. 98.4 
  1984.4. 48.5 32 Seeboard 1990.12. 97.5 
7 Enterprise Oil 1984.7. 100 33 Soughern Electric 1990.12. 97.5 
8 Jaguar 1984.8. 100 34 South Wesern Electricity 1990.12. 97.5 
1984.12. 50.2 35 Yorkshire Electricity 1990.12. 97.5 
1991.12. 25.9 36 Regional Electricity 1990.12. 
9 
British 
Telecommunica
tions 1993.7. 20.7 37 National Power 1991.3. 60.9 
10 British Gas 1986.12. 96.6   1995.3. 38.3 
11 British Airways 1987.2. 97.5 38 PowerGen 1991.3. 59.5 
12 Rolls-Royce 1987.5. 96.7   1995.3. 36.6 
13 BAA 1987.7. 95.6 39 
National Power-
PowerGen 1991.3.  
14 British Steel 1988.12. 100 40 
National Power-
PowerGen 1995.3.  
15 Anglian Water 1989.12. 98.4 41 Scottish Hydro-Electric 1991.6. 96.6 
16 
Northumbrian 
Water 1989.12. 98.4 42 Scottish Power 1991.6. 96.6 
17 
North West 
Water 1989.12. 98.4 43 
Scottish Hydro-
Electric/power 1991.6.  
18 Severn Trent 1989.12. 98.4 44 
Northern Ireland 
Electricity 1993.6. 96.5 
45 Railtrack 1996.5. 98 
19 Southern Water 1989.12. 98.4 46 British Energy 1996.7. 87.8 
Source: Curwen and Hartley (1997) and Price Waterhouse (1990) 
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C. The Effect and General Evaluation 
It is important to see whether UK privatization and deregulation has actually led to efficiency 
improvements.  According to the multi-firm studies that illustrate labor productivity and total 
factor productivity measures, two sets of conclusions can be drawn.  One set is based on the 
overall impact of privatization, the other on the relative performance of individual firms. 
a. Overall Impact: Privatization does have a positive impact on financial performance 
rather than on productivity.  Privatization itself does not seem to be associated with an 
acceleration of productivity growth or profitability.  It seems that management changes 
within the public sector prior to privatization did however lead to improvements in 
performance prior to privatization.  
b. Performance of Individual Firms: Some privatizations were clear successes: British 
Airways, Cable and Wireless, and Amersham International. Reorganization prior to 
privatization was a clear success in these firms: British Steel and British Coal.  However, 
privatizations of Jaguar and BAA seem to have yielded little benefit. 
2.1.2. UK utility Industry Survey 
A. Monopoly Power 
The early privatizations in UK following 1979 exposed few competition problems.  The 
privatization of utilities industry started in the second Conservative administration.  The 
administration had to decide how to regulate a firm with a significant amount of monopoly 
power and to define the government’s role in reducing inefficiency.  The two important aims 
of utility privatization were to introduce competition and to ensure that newly private firms 
do not abuse their monopoly powers.   
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The United Kingdom was one of the first countries to privatize utilities, selling off British 
Telecom in 1984, British Gas in 1986, the water industry in 1989, and the electricity industry 
in 1990.  The emergence of significant public ownership in gas, electricity, and water can be 
traced to the need to control prices charged by incumbent firms without allowing excessive 
duplication of assets which were subject to large economies of scale.  The UK also pioneered 
the use of price control regulation, which was deemed essential to ensure that the monopoly 
power was not abused when privatizing a public monopoly. 
B. Regulation of Privatized Monopolies 
Faced with the privatization of British Telecom and other utilities the government had a 
number of choices in 1983.  There were two main approaches to prevent monopolistic 
infrastructure firms from charging excessively high prices: price cap regulation and rate-of-
return regulation.  The rate-of-return approach was used in Canada, Japan, and the United 
States.  The UK government adopted the Retail Price Index X (RPI-X) method, which proved 
to be a wise choice later10.  
a. Price Cap or RPI-X Method:  Under the RPI-X system of price control, the price 
charged by a regulated monopoly is permitted to increase from year to year by a specified 
maximum overall percentage.  This percentage increase, RPI-X, consists of the difference 
between the increase in the retail price index (a measure of inflation) and some factor X.  X 
represents some measure of expected efficiency improvements in the regulated enterprise 
relative to the rest of the economy.  X may be negative or positive. 11 
                                                 
10 Kagami, Mitsuhiro and Masatsugu Tsuji, Privatization, Deregulation and Economic Efficiency,
 Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2000: 114 
 
11   Kagami, Mitsuhiro and Masatsugu Tsuji, Privatization, Deregulation and Economic Efficiency, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2000: 182 
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b. Rate of Return Regulation:  This method involves regulating the profits of utilities 
on the basis of an allowed rate of return on their capital assets.  Pure rate of return regulation 
is essentially a ”cost-plus” method of regulation with disincentives to cut costs.  The 
advantage of this system is that it is easy to administer and enforce and provides transparency.  
It actually operates via a quasi-judicial process where regulated companies or their customers 
may apply for changes in prices on the grounds of a change to the rate of return on the 
companies’ assets.   
c. Problems With Rate-of-return Regulation:  There are inherent problems with 
imposing the rate-of-return constraint on a firm’s behavior.  Empirical cases also suggest that  
it is not desirable method to regulate natural monopolies.  The major problem with this 
method of regulation is the perverse incentives that it gives companies, both to increase their 
capital assets and not to seek cost reductions.12 
i.  Allowable Costs 
First, the firm may have incentive to exaggerate its cost.   By claiming that operating costs 
are greater than they actually are, the firm is in a position to increase its revenue and still 
remain within the allowed rate of return.  Second, the firm can incur costs that are not 
necessarily in the best interest of consumers.  
ii.  Incentives for Cost Reduction 
There is usually little incentive for a firm to hold down its operating costs if they can pass 
them onto the consumers.  The regulator will not only be a watchdog on waste but also must 
monitor the firm’s effort in seeking least costly solutions.  Another undesirable incentive is 
                                                 
12 Price Caps, Rate-of-Return Regulation, and the Cost of Capital Private Sector, the World Bank, 
1996 
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that firms subject to rate-of-return regulation tend to accumulate too much capital for the 
output being produced.  Because the allowed revenue, net of operating costs, depends on the 
rate base (capital), there is an incentive to increase the level of capital beyond what is needed 
for economically efficient production.  
iii.  Rate-base Determination and the Allowed Return 
It is not always easy to measure the firm’s rate base.  The firm’s capital stock, or rate base, is 
instrumental in determining the firm’s total profit.  The calculation of the rate base is 
particularly critical for natural monopolies such as electric utilities and local 
telecommunications companies with very high capital-to-sales ratios.  The rate base should 
be the fair value of the capital.  In calculating the fair value, the original cost of the capital, 
its market value, and its replacement (present) cost should all be considered.  However, these 
three measures individually taken will yield different results.13 
d. Comparison Between RPI-X Method and Rate-of-return Regulation:  Price cap 
and rate-of-return regulation have different effects on regulated firms as long as price cap 
reviews are sufficiently infrequent (say, every five years).  A price cap subjects businesses to 
more risks.  For example, under price cap regulation, if a firm’s costs rise, its profits will fall 
because it cannot raise its prices to compensate for the cost increases —at least until the next 
price review, which may be several years away. 14 
Under rate-of-return regulation, however, the business would seek—and, typically, be 
granted within a year or so—a compensating price rise, so its profits would not change much.  
                                                 
13 Berg, Sanford V. and John Tschirhart, Natural Monopoly Regulation, Principles and Practice, 
Cambridge University Press, 1988 
14 Johnson, Christopher, Privatization and Ownership, Lloyds Bank Annual Review, 1988:89 
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But if the firm’s costs fall, price cap regulation is more advantageous to the firm than rate-of-
return regulation, because it would retain more of the resulting benefits as profits.  Thus, 
under rate-of-return regulation, consumers bear some of the risk that firms bear in price cap 
systems. 
This difference in impact means that firms subject to price cap regulation have a stronger 
incentive to lower their costs because they keep more of the cost savings than they would if 
they were subject to rate-of-return regulation. But the increased risk they bear tends to raise 
their cost of capital. (Table 3)15 
Table 3. Alternative Systems of Economic Regulation 
System Major Characteristics 
Average prices limited, in real terms 
No limit on profitability 
RPI-X Maximum incentives to cost-cutting 
Ceiling on profit as % of capital employed 
No limit on prices 
Rate-of-return Maximum incentives to investment 
 
e. Application of RPI-X Method16:  In UK, prices are mainly regulated under a RPI-X 
structure, in which prices are allowed to rise by the rate of inflation (as measured by the RPI) 
and an efficiency factor ”X”.  The efficiency factor is set for each industry periodically 
(typically every five years) to reflect the scope for cost savings in the industry.  For example, 
                                                 
15 Johnson, Christopher, Privatization and Ownership, Lloyds Bank Annual Review, 1988:79  
16 Johnson, Christopher, Privatization and Ownership, Lloyds Bank Annual Review, 1988:80 
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if the X factor was set at 3 per cent then overall prices in the industry would be permitted to 
rise by the RPI-3 per cent each year until next price review.  17 
The price control applies to prices of monopolized services and not to service where 
sufficient competition has emerged.  The proper choice of an X factor is critical for the long-
term viability of any price cap regulation plan. 18 If too small an X factor is imposed, the 
regulated firm will earn excessive profit and thereby jeopardize political support for the 
regulatory regime.  If too large an X factor is imposed, the financial integrity of the regulated 
firm can be threatened.  Therefore, the essence of price cap regulation is to select an X factor 
that poses a significant challenge to the regulated firm, and that promises gains for 
consumers relative to alternative regulatory regimes.  
X will depend on the industry being regulated.19  The setting of X for an industry depends on 
estimates of what operating and investment costs might be required for a particular monopoly 
firm.  Estimates of these can be obtained from analysis of the costs incurred by similar firms.  
Comparisons of efficiency are particularly important in setting initial prices at the start of the 
regulatory review period.   
In the case of BT, X took a very high value of around 3 percent; British Gas and British 
Airports were permitted an X of 2 and 1 percent respectively. 20 In water, the rule is RPI + K, 
where K represents both expected productivity gains and a permitted annual increase in the 
                                                 
17 Kagami, Mitsuhiro and Masatsugu Tsuji, Privatization, Deregulation and Economic Efficiency, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2000 
 
18  Bernstein, Jeffrey I. and David E. M. Sappington, How to Determine the X in RPI - X 
Regulation: A User's Guide, 2000 
19 Johnson, Christopher, Privatization and Ownership, Lloyds Bank Annual Review, 1988:80  
20 Johnson, Christopher, Privatization and Ownership, Lloyds Bank Annual Review, 1988:80  
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real price of water to allow for quality improvements (think of it as RPI – X + Q, where Q 
stands for the quality improvement).  
i.  Basic Guideline 
The X factor should reflect the extent to which the regulated industry has historically 
achieved higher productivity growth and faced lower input price inflation than other 
industries in the economy.  This guideline is appropriate during the specified period of price 
cap regulation when the following four conditions hold: (1) All of the regulated firm's 
services are subject to price cap regulation; (2) No major structural changes (such as a 
strengthening of competitive forces) are anticipated in the regulated industry; (3) The rate of 
price inflation outside of the regulated sector is not affected by the pricing decisions of the 
regulated firm; and (4) The economy outside of the regulated sector is competitive. 
ii. Time Spacing of Price Reviews 
The longer the period between price reviews, the bigger the incentive.  However, the price 
reviews must not be too frequent otherwise shareholders could achieve little in the way of 
profit gains thus diminishing efficiency incentives.  If the X factor were immediately 
adjusted when costs are reduced by a large amount, then, in effect, the price cap would 
become a rate of return or cost of service regulation; and the incentive to reduce costs by 
more than X would be removed.  
iii. Need for Balance 
As the regulator, the government needs to ensure balance between ensuring a profitable 
environment for new entrants and promoting more competition.  It needs to know the 
marginal costs (cost function) and demand function of the regulated enterprise to set prices 
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optimally.  The regulator is responsible for managing the level of competition in the industry.  
The regulators in the past have favored more competition but have been aware of the need to 
make market entry attractive to newcomers.  Too high an access charge would deter 
competition, while too low a charge would lead to an excessive expansion of the industry.  
2.1.3. Case Study: UK Water Industry 
In the simplest form, price increases are just capped by the formula RPI-X.  However, price 
capping formula can be much more complicated.  From the study on evolution of price cap 
regulation of UK water industry, especially after the review of the first period of the 
privatization, we may have clearer understanding on how to apply the price cap regulation to 
improve the competition.  
A. First Stage 
From 1973 to 1989, there were ten vertically integrated water authorities in the UK, each 
responsible for providing water, sewerage, and drainage services in England and in Wales.  
The assets of these water authorities were transferred to 10 subsidiary companies, which 
were sold to the private sector in 1989 as part of the Conservative government’s wide 
ranging privatization program.  At the time of privatization, the government and the water 
supply purchasers recognized that substantial investment was required in the industry to raise 
drinking water quality and environmental quality to European Union Standard.  A condition 
of the sales was that the water supply companies should improve quality. 
a. Contents:  In September 1989, the assets and liabilities of the then water authorities 
were transferred to ten subsidiary companies within holding companies (known as Water 
Groups).  Shares in the holding companies were sold in November 1989.  Each subsidiary 
company was granted a 25-year operating license, making them responsible for all water and 
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wastewater services, including extracting raw water, delivering processed water, and 
receiving, treating, and discharging wastewater.  The Secretary of State for the Environment 
of Wales (depending on where the appointee operates) can terminate these operating licenses 
at anytime, provided it gives 10 years notice. 
b. Regulation:  The Government introduced price-cap regulation in 1990.  This was in 
response to concern that the utilities would abuse their monopoly power.  In 1989, companies 
were asked to provide estimates of their future costs with reference to an asset management 
plan.  These costs were scrutinized by consulting engineers and then reduced on the basis of 
the potential for efficiency saving.  This information formed the basis of the first price cap 
formula which was:  
Price cap 1990 to 1995 = RPI + K  
RPI represented the retail price index.  K represented the incremental cost of quality improvements 
minus the efficiency element.  
To prevent service providers from exercising monopoly power by lowering quality instead of 
prices, the price capping formula contains a quality factor.  The government also held 
monopoly power in check during the first years of privatization by holding special (or 
“golden”) shares in the ten water and sewerage holding companies. These special shares were 
redeemed on 31 December 1994 to expose water and sewerage companies to competitive 
disciplines through threat of merger and takeover. 
c. Outcome:  OFWAT, the UK’s water supply regulator, believed that the water 
companies were able to exert undue influence over government in the setting of these initial 
pricing limits.  The result of these limits was that water charges increased by about five 
percent per annum or 25 percent in real terms.  There was considerable customer unrest as 
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the first periodic review of the price formula approached.  Water affordability was becoming 
an issue for a number of low-income customers.  The water companies’ return on 
investments was around 13 percent.  As part of the review process, OFWAT later determined 
that the average cost of capital was five to six percent.  
B. Recent Stage and the Evolution of Price Cap Regulation 
a. Measuring Price Cap: A more precise cost and output matrix was defined as part of 
the first periodic review and companies were requested to put forward an asset management 
plan for the second pricing period.  OFWAT, on inspection of these plans, found them to be 
gold plated, being little more than overbids for resources to carry out dubious improvements.  
A process of cutting these bids and their costs down to size commenced.  It is reported that 
the debate between the regulator and the companies about the cost of capital was intense and 
at times heated.  The review outcome was that the escalator K in the previous price cap was 
reduced from five percent per annum to one percent.  The K escalator was also broken down 
into its components of quality and efficiency as follows: 
Price cap 1995 to 2000 =RPI +Q - X where: 
+ Q is the incremental upward cost pressure of quality improvements and 
- X is the forward looking efficiency improvement. 
Consumer dissatisfaction continued after the 1995 periodic review.  Customers and the 
opposition party were dissatisfied that the water companies management were receiving large 
remuneration packages while water companies were earning large profits.  With a change in 
Government in 1997 a special one-off tax was imposed on water companies.  This tax was 
intended to redress the “bad deal” the new labor government considered its predecessor had 
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struck on water utility privatization.  
Preparation for the second periodic review of the price cap in the Year 2000 was undertaken 
using a new price cap methodology as follows: 
Price cap 2000 to 2005 = RPI - P - X + Q ± V ± S where: 
P is an initial reduction in prices for high performance (profitability) in the previous period; 
X is the forward looking efficiency improvement during the period; 
Q is the incremental upward cost pressure of quality improvements; 
V is to balance supply and demand pressures; 
S is a service factor reflecting enhancements or controlled reductions in standards. 
b. Difference from Previous Stage Regulation:  Unlike previous periodic reviews, 
companies will not be required to produce asset management plans detailing costs.  This plan 
is to be produced after the review has concluded and the price cap variable has been 
determined.  The plan is intended to become a monitoring document during the period 2000 - 
2005. 
OFWAT’s director has indicated that he expects water prices, after the review and the 
introduction of the new formula, to be cut and then remain generally stable for the next four 
years  this means that X should be equal or greater than Q+V+S.  Source: OFWAT (1998). 
c. Implications:  The UK’s experience with price cap regulation highlights that 
substantial care is required in developing price caps in the water supply industry.  This 
experience demonstrates the pitfalls that can be associated with this form of regulation, 
which could help other regulators to introduce effective and well-designed price cap 
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arrangements. 
When price caps are reviewed, it is common for the regulator to examine profitability and 
rates of return.  For this reason, it has also been argued that, as price capping mechanisms 
evolve, they become profit-limiting mechanisms and can converge into rate of return 
regulation.  This can occur where the regulator increases the value of X or some other 
variable in response to observed high profits earned in the period prior to the review.  In this 
environment, firms may come to learn that increased efficiency will be offset by a higher X 
in the next period and they may alter their behavior accordingly.  Thus, over the longer run, 
care must be taken to ensure that the utility does not have an incentive to gold plate 
investments or inflate costs. 
King (1998) points out that if this form of monopoly regulation is applied carefully it can 
offer substantial benefits to all parties concerned.  However, if price cap regulation is poorly 
designed or subject to arbitrary re-evaluation it may be worse than more traditional forms of 
monopoly regulation.  He argues that, to be effective, the regulator of price caps should: 
- Carefully consider the bundle of goods and services to be covered by the cap to 
avoid anti-competitive abuse but to permit flexibility. 
- Design the review process so that information used in periodic price cap reviews 
is outside of the control of the regulated firm and is not based on past performance to avoid 
the cap degenerating into rate of return regulation.  The use of industry performance data 
rather than firm level data could assist here. 
- Maintain credibility of the system by not arbitrarily revising X factors midterm 
on the basis of current profit information. 
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2.2. Japan Privatization 
2.2.1. Japan Country Survey 
A. Initial Conditions  
By the late half of 1970s, Japan had reached a crisis situation.  The financial structure was 
inflexible and could not adapt to the necessity of reducing expenditures.  In 1975, the 
government began issuing special bonds (deficit bonds) to help cover administrative 
expenditures.  By 1979, bonds had been issued for a total of US$438.5 billion and the 
government’s dependence on them had reached 39.6% of the government’s total budget.  
This level was extremely high compared with those of other leading OECD countries, whose 
dependence ratios in 1979 ranged from 5.6% (USA) to 14.2% (Germany).  In particular, the 
deficits generated by the Japanese National Railways (JNR), the Foodstuff Control Special 
Account, and the National Health Insurance System posed critical financial problems for the 
government. 21 
A. Initiation 
The Provisional Committee on Administrative Reform was created in March 1981 to address 
these problems and was charged with devising the drastic measures necessary to achieve 
fiscal reform without raising taxes.  In 1982, the Committee proposed the privatization of the 
three largest public corporations---Japan National Railways (JNR), Japan Monopoly 
Corporation (tobacco and salt), and Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation.  
The Committee also instituted requirements for the review of all projects requiring 
administrative approval and government funding, and mandated private sector participation 
                                                 
21 Kagami, Mitsuhiro and Masatsugu Tsuji, Privatization, Deregulation and Economic Efficiency, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2000 
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in all large urban development projects.22 
B. Features 
Fundamental changes in privatization took place in the middle of the 1980s.  Four big SOEs, 
i.e. NTTPC, Japan Monopoly Co., Japan Airlines, and JNR, were privatized Some features 
can be drawn from these processes.23 
a. Japan’s privatization of public utilities such as NTTPC and JNR is incomplete.  The 
government still has controlling power in terms of shareholding, appointment of directors, 
price setting, and business activities.  
b. Privatization and deregulation processes are also at the halfway stage.  The processes 
with regard to public utilities recognized as natural monopolies such as electricity, gas, water, 
and the post office have been delayed or even left untouched.  The number of approvals and 
permissions to be issued by Government agencies has not decreased.  
c. The sales of SOEs directly helped government revenues.  The government received 
US$78.6 billion from NTT, US$4.5 billion from Japan Tobacco Inc., US$8.6 billion from JR-
East Japan, and US$3.8 billion from JR-West Japan sales.  Corporate tax revenues also 
increased as privatized companies made profits. 
d. Long-term liabilities of SOEs have not been solved.  For example, JNR Settlement 
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Corporation has left debts of US$ 224 billion, which remain a huge burden for taxpayers.24 
2.2.2. Case Study I: Japan Telecommunication Market 
Japan’s two stage-reform, which applied the rate-of-return regulation first and RPI-X 
regulation subsequently, yielded different outcomes, which shed light on the advantages and 
disadvantages of both two methods.   
A. First Stage Reform in 1985 
The main method of regulation used for privatization during this first stage is rate-of-return.  
However, the outcome was not as desirable as the government had anticipated.  
a. Rates Change:   
i.  Rates Raised in Monopolistic Sectors 
Due to a re-balancing of rates, the rates of long-distance calls were lowered, while those of 
local calls were raised.  In 1985, the basic charge for NTT’s subscribers increased from 1,550 
yen to 1,750 yen, and local calls by use of public telephones from 10 yen to 30 yen. 
ii. Rate Gap between Japan and Foreign Countries 
There are still big differences in rates between Japan and other foreign countries.  For 
example, Japanese telephone subscription charges on average are 4-13 times higher than that 
of the USA, the UK, Germany, and France.  Short-distance leased circuit line charges are 3-6 
times higher than those of New York and London.25 
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b. Rate-of-return:  Even though rates were substantially reduced for some services, 
they were still quite high when compared internationally.  This was mainly due to the scheme 
of price regulation.  In the UK, the reform introduced price-cap regulation.  This forced 
carriers to reduce rates as well as provide an incentive for efficient management.  Japan 
retained the rate of return regulation which kept the rates high. 26 
B. Second Stage 
The second stage reform on NTT was initiated in December 1996.  As for regulation on 
pricing, the rate-of-return regulation was replaced by a price cap regulation.27  The legislation 
for implementing a price cap for telephone charges was passed by the Diet in May 1998.  The 
main features are the following: 
a. Aims of the Price Cap:  Under a price cap, since carriers are able to freely set rates 
as long as they do not exceed the cap price, it gives carriers more freedom and incentive in 
terms of management regarding the rates charged, which in turn promote efficiency.  
Therefore, it was no longer necessary to ask the authorities for their approval of rate changes, 
as in the rate-of-return regulation.  It also implies that the authorities will not be able to 
regulate carriers beforehand; rather, they will have to cope with the problems after they occur.  
b. Criteria to Choose Services Covered by a Price Cap:  The price cap covers 
services that are indispensable for daily life and the economy and has a low level of 
competition. To determine which services are to be covered by a price cap, the following 
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issues were examined: i) Contents of services, characteristics of users, number of users, 
penetration rates, and future trends of services; ii). Number of carriers, market shares, rate 
levels, and international rates.  The following services were to be covered by caps:  Local 
calls, ISDN, and Leased circuits. 28 
In sum, two different types of regulations were applied in Japan’s telecommunication market 
in different stages.  The results seem to suggest that the RPI-X method is a more suitable for 
natural monopoly to generate the efficiency when privatizing this type of industries.  
However, drawing from UK’s privatization experience on water utilities  under the same 
RPI-X method, necessary adjustments could be made  in order to tailor the needs and  
different characteristics of an industry. 
2.2.3. Case Study II: Japan National Railways (JNR) 
A. Background  
The privatization of JNR, Japan’s largest public corporation,  was the largest in scale.  The 
privatization of JNR was among the most critical tasks of the Provisional Committee. In 1980, 
JNR employed nearly 414,000 workers and its huge annual losses were increasing annually.  
In 1987, JNR was broken up into six regionally based railroad passenger companies and a 
seventh company was created to handle freight transportation for the entire country (JRs). 
The major portion of JNR’s debt, which had reached $286 billion by the end of 1986, was 
reassigned to the JNR Settlement Corporation along with any surplus real estate of JNR and 
the shares of the newly created JRs.  The JNR Settlement Corporation planned to repay 
US$91 billion by selling JNR’s real estate and stocks while the outstanding US$106 billion 
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was to be paid by the government, that is, taxpayers’ burden. 29 
B. JNR Privatization Process 
In July 1985, the Supervisory Committee submitted it written opinion concerning the 
restructuring of JNR to the Prime Minister.  In April 1987 JNR privatization was initiated, 
which consisted of two phases. 
In the first phase, JNR was converted into a stock company and government control was 
relaxed.  The objective of the first phase was to create the conditions necessary to induce 
private investment by running JNR competitively and efficiently, like a private company.   In 
the second phase, all stocks were sold to private investors, thereby completing JNR’s 
transformation into a privately owned company.  The government supervision and 
restrictions on the new companies were reduced to a minimum so that a new management 
system, in which management can effectively exercise its responsibility and authority.  
Because JNR in 1980s was virtually in a state of bankruptcy, it would have been difficult to 
sell stock directly to private investors.  So this two-phase approach was adopted in order to 
provide an intermediate stage. 
a. First Phase:  Although JRs have operated as commercialized stock companies, all 
the shares were still owned by the JNR Settlement Corporation.  As soon as the JRs meet the 
listing requirements of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the shares of JRs would be listed and sold 
to the public and hence complete the transition to private enterprise.   
The Exchange requirements are: 1) Net assets must be twice as large as paid-in-capital; 2) 
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Both current and pre-tax profits in the financial period immediately before listing must be 
more than 40% of paid-in-capital and more than 30% of paid –in-capital in the two preceding 
periods; 3) A dividend must have been paid in the immediately preceding period; and 4) The 
company must have been in business continuously for at least five years. 
It took seven years for three JRs to meet the above requirements and complete the first phase.  
When the first phase was completed in 1992, the government and the JNR Settlement 
Corporation began to sell shares, completing the sale of all stocks within four or five years. 
i.  Passenger Railway Division was Divided into Six Companies 
The companies were: Three on the main island of Honshu and one each on the three islands 
of Hokkaido, Shikoku, and Kyushu.  A seventh firm handled freight for the entire country.  
The profitability of each new company was carefully measured and steps were taken to 
ensure that theses companies maintained solid managerial bases.  The Shinkansen Holding 
Corporation was established.  The Management Stabilizing Fund was created for smaller 
passenger companies to offset the imbalance between revenues and expenditures.  The JNR 
Settlement Corporation provided the capital for this Fund. 
ii.  Remaining $197 Billion Liabilities were Assumed by JNR SC 
 Established as the successor to the old JNR, JNR Settlement Corporation also received the 
shares of the JRs and the surplus real estate of JNR as well as the redundant workers.  The 
remainder debt is expected to be borne by the general budget account.30 
iii. JNR had around 200,000 Redundant Workers in 1980 
The government actively promoted various measures to secure job changes for these workers.  
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The public sector was asked to employ JNR workers without increasing total employees, and 
the private sector voluntarily accepted JNR workers.  The elimination of the redundant work 
force largely by job transitioning was carried out smoothly, aided in part by economic growth 
and by the very low unemployment rate of the late 1980s.  Finally, the number of remaining 
JNR employees transferred to the JNR Settlement Corporation in April 1990.   Only 1,050 
employees were ultimately dismissed because they refused to move to newly allotted 
placements.31 
b. Second Phase:  The main tasks in the second phase of privatizing JNR were the 
following: 
i. Debts of JNR Settlement Corporation 
A major portion of $197 billion of JNR’s debts was reassigned to the JNR Settlement 
Corporation along with the real estate and shares of the JRs.  These debts were expected to 
be repaid by the sale of real estate and shares.  However, the land sales have been carried out 
at a much slower pace than initially planed due to the government’s decision in October 1987 
to prohibit competitive bidding for the real estate of the JNR Settlement Corporation.  The 
government made its decision at the expense of and against the objective of the JNR 
Settlement Corporation, because it was thought that such bidding might push general land 
prices up further. 
ii. Sales of JRs Shares. 
As the JRs met the listing requirements of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, their shares would be 
listed and sold.  Three of the JRs have already met the requirements and the sales of their 
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shares began in 1992.  
C.  Evaluation of JNR Privatization 
Overall, privatization of JNR is recognized as a success after more than 10 years of 
experience.  Services have been improved, facilities have been renewed, and train schedules 
have became more reliable.  Fares for the main Honshu Island companies were not raised 
except for some adjustments in line with the introduction of a national consumer tax. 
The general performance (transport volume and profits) of the six newly created passenger 
railway companies and the freight company (JRs) has been considerably higher than that of 
JNR.  JRs became profitable, reduced costs and increased efficiency. Transport volume in 
terms of both passenger and freight augmented and labor productivity improved.  It has 
greatly exceeded the standards set by the Supervisory Committee before the restructuring of 
JNR.  As a result, the repayment of the liabilities assumed by the JRs has been progressing 
well.  Furthermore, government subsidies for the JRs have declined substantially while the 
JRs are paying large sums in corporate taxed, thereby contributing positively to government 
finances.32 
In addition to these quantitative changes, other changes have occurred such as improvement 
in the quality of service and aggressive business diversification.  These changes have served 
to enhance customer satisfaction with the JRs and have helped to transform the unfavorable 
image that the railways had during the JNR era into a more favorable one. 
However, there still remains the heavy debt problem.33  The JNR Settlement Corporation had 
an outstanding debt of US$224 billion as of March 1997.  In particular, the sale of real estate 
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was unsuccessful due to the land price deflation that followed the end of the so-called bubble 
economy.  The corporation was dissolved in 1998 and the majority of its debt was transferred 
to the government.  The burden then fell on smokers because the government raised the 
cigarette tax from December 1998 to repay the debt. 
D. Lessons from JNR privatization 
From JNR’s privatization experience, some important lessons can be drawn, which can be 
applied to the privatization in the developing countries. 
a. Importance of Careful Planning:  The privatization of JNR was not carried out 
hastily.  It took six years from the establishment of the Provisional Committee in March 1981 
to the JNR’s corporatization and restructuring in April 1987.  The planning process alone 
took six years, while the implementation, including the selling of JR’s stock, required  
additional five years.  During this period, the issues of privatization were widely debated, 
various measures were canvassed, and implementation was ultimately carried out with great 
care.  
b. Leaving the Sins of the Past in the Past:  It was critical that the old debt burden be 
properly apportioned so as not to sink any of the new companies, and that the planner is 
conservative as to the ability of the new companies to carry old debt.  In truth, many of JNR’s 
financial problems were acknowledged to have been the result of misbegotten government 
policy or interference in the past.  The new companies have been given a fresh start, on a 
stable financial basis, without trying to make up for past mistakes. 
c. Timing of Business cycle: 34 Economic condition at the time of privatization is very 
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important.  At the implementation stage, the economic environment was favorable, making it 
easier to find jobs for a redundant work force.  This favorable timing provided a boost to the 
economic performance of the newly created companies.  Stocks can also be sold at higher 
prices to repay SOEs’ debts.  However, these results would not have been achieved during 
periods of recession.  Thus, timing of privatization is of the utmost importance. 
d. Separation of Privatization and Political Influence:  Any organization carrying out 
privatization must have through knowledge of the SOE to be privatized, have an adequate 
strategy for the privatization, and a strong desire to see it carried out fully.  In the case of the 
JNR privatization, the Provisional Committee and the Supervisory Committee, both were 
independent from political influence, were able to formulate effective strategies.  The 
successful privatization can only be achieved when the correct political conditions exist.  In 
the case of JNR, the Liberal Democratic Party, which was in support of privatization, had a 
stable majority in the Diet.  Thus, the laws necessary for privatization were enacted with few 
problems. 
e. Realistic Methods and Strategies: In the case of JNR privatization, a two-phase 
method was adopted.  During the first phase, efficiency gains and the introduction of 
competition were the main objectives.  These objectives were met by creating seven stock 
companies each with their own managerial bases of viability.  The second phase consists of 
long-term issues such as the sale of shares and assets, and the elimination of debt.  This two-
phase approach was an effective method to privatize a huge and virtually bankrupt 
organization such as JNR. 
 
2.3. Korea Privatization 
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Privatization in Korea proves to be a long process, as the past decades of privatization effort 
in Korea shows.  The initial concept of privatization could trace back to early 1980s, but yet 
to be completed until 2001.  KT, a large public enterprise, was privatized very recently, 
which is too early to quantitatively evaluate the outcome and effect of privatization. The 
main goals of Korea case study are therefore to identify those factors which could lead to 
successes or failures in Korean privatization cases and to identify a feasible privatization 
policy issues such as role of capital liberalization, ownership, deregulation, etc, for the other 
countries. 
2.3.1. Korea’s Country Survey  
Korea has two types of public enterprises: Government Owned Corporations (GOCs) and 
Government Invested Corporations (GICs), depending on whether they were subject to the 
Framework Act for GOCs. 35   The general rule that differentiated GOCs from GICs is 
government ownership.  GOCs, which are more rigidly linked to public policy objectives, are 
more closely identified with the functions of the government itself.  GICs were considered as 
having stronger commercial elements by the government and were thus allowed to enjoy 
greater freedom in their operations than GOCs.   
AS of October 1998, all of the 26 corporations except KBS, in which the government’s share 
was 50 percent or higher, were subject to the Framework Act.  The Framework Act basically 
perceives a GOC as a subsidiary of the line industry and tries to constrain the management of 
the GOC to achieve the policy objectives set by the line ministry with as little costs as 
possible. 
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A. The First Stage 
a. The Initial Conditions:  The first privatization program was implemented in the 
early 1980s.36  Privatization was one component of a general liberalization policy, which the 
government adopted in 1980.  It was believed that Korea’s economy required a more rapid 
development of the financial sector.  Addressing an increasing problem of inefficiencies 
within the public enterprise set, the government passed the Government-Invested Enterprise 
Management Law in December 1983, which introduced a performance evaluation system for 
public enterprises.  In 1987, privatization was aimed at the development of private enterprise 
in the industrial and financial sectors.  The plan was intended to reduce the inefficiencies of 
public enterprises, alleviate the financial burden of the government, and enlarge the size of 
capital in the privatization program. 
b.  Contents:  In the early 1980s, four financial institutions including Hanil Bank, 
Korea First Bank, Bank of Seoul and Trust Company, and Cho-Hung Bank were sold to 
private firms and investors using asset sale method.  Buying parties were both large private 
firms and banking firms, which are themselves public enterprises.  In order to prevent 
ownership and control by a single interest group, restrictions were placed on maximum 
equity holding and voting rights.  Firms and individual investors were allocated 50 percent 
each, with a share limit of 5 percent for firms and 5,000 shares for each individual investor in 
the first issue.  The ownership limit was 8 percent after it was circulated.  The major 
shareholder on privatized financial institution got 7.9 percent of total shares after four years 
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circulation.37 
c. Evaluation:   The first privatization in Korea cannot be considered as a 
straightforward success.  If we use performance indicators such as total profit, the average 
rates of return and sales per employee, etc, to evaluate the effectiveness of privatization, the 
privatization of three companies (Korea Line Corp., Korea Shipbuilding and Engineering 
Corp., and Korea Dredging Corp) did not improve their performance.  The deficit increased 
and the average rate of return declined though sale per employee increased due to 
competition in the market. The government’s deregulatory efforts over this period since 1982 
fell short of public expecations. 38 
On the other hand and general speaking, six firms including Korea Air Lines Co. and the 
Korea Express Co. showed increase in efficiency after privatization.  Two firms including 
Korea Line Corp. and Korea Salt  Co. showed decreased in efficiency after privatization.  
The effect of privatization on the other seven firms including Inchon Iron and Steel Co., 
Hanil and Cho-Hung Bank, has been less significant.39 
d. Lessons:  Several lessons can be drawn from Korea’s experience on privatization.  
One of them is that, for the efficiency of the monetary market, the privatization of 
commercial banks may be a necessary condition, but is definitely not a sufficient 
condition.(Bon-Ho Koo, 1985)40  The government has only slightly reduced its control over 
bank organization in practice and, here exists an excessive fragmentation of interest rates.  
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Furthermore, direct credits by the government have continued to grow so that the banks 
involved have operated more as a conduit for government funds rather than as financial 
institutions with independent decision-making authority.   
In sum, the privatization of commercial banks has done little to enhance competition and 
efficiency in financial markets in Korea.  The main barrier behind is heavy indebtedness of 
the corporate sector, which is the biggest constraint on full liberalization of interest rates.  
The liberalization of interest rates, which would have resulted in higher interest rates, was 
strongly opposed by the big corporations, which argued that higher interests rates would 
weaken international competitiveness and cause inflation by increasing production costs. 
Another lesson to be learnt is government’s failure to undertake necessaryderegulation while 
implementing privatization.  On the contrary, the government has continued to impose 
regulations on the term structures and on fund management, which have had harmful effects 
for profit-oriented managers.  Broad deregulation along with privatization is very much 
needed. 
B. The Second (Recent) Stage 
a. Prior to Financial Crisis:  In 1994, Kim, Young Sam administration commissioned a 
comprehensive study of several public enterprises, including KEPCO, Korea Telecom (KT), 
POSCO, and KT&G.  Privatization became one of the key economic policies of Kim, Young 
Sam administration, which kept pushing for a tangible outcome.  In late 1997, the Kim, 
Young Sam administration introduced the Act for Privatization and Improvement of the 
Efficiency of Large Public Enterprises, generally referred to as the “Special Act on 
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Privatization”, to promote privatization of four large public enterprises.41 
i. Content 
The Act targeted four public enterprises (KE&G, KT, KOGAS, and Korea Heavy), and had 
two main elements.  First, it put restrictions on the ownership of all four public enterprises in 
order to prevent chaebols from acquiring controlling interests.  Specifically, the combined 
share of any investor should not exceed 15 percent of each of the four public enterprises.  
Second, the Act stipulated that the board must consist of only civilians, thus removing the 
presence of the line industry as well as the Ministry of Finance and Economy from the board. 
42 
ii. Evolution 
The Special Act and other privatization measures introduced in 1997 were far from a 
complete privatization package.  The Act failed to completely sever the ties with policy 
consideration and allowed the line ministry to maintain shareholder’s rights.  It still contained 
a clause that explicitly stated that the management of the public enterprises must consider 
public policy objectives when making decisions, which are not consistent with the 
privatization spirit of the Act.  However, it was still the greatest step in the direction of 
privatization ever taken in Korea until that time. 
b. After 1998 Financial Crisis:  In 1998, privatization was far more comprehensive in 
scope and depth than any other privatization effort by all of the previous administrations.  In 
July 1998, the Budget and Planning Commission, a new government agency created by the 
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new administration, that is, Kim, Dae Jung administration, announced an ambitious 
privatization and restructuring plan that covered 108 public enterprises. The main contents 
are summarized as following:43 
Table 4: Korea Privatization Plan of 1998 
Solutions Targeted GOCs and GICs 
 Targeted Subsidiaries of GOCs 
and GICs 
Pohang Iron and Steel Co. 
Korea Heavy Industries and 
Construction Co. 
Korea General Chemical Co. 
Korea Technology Banking Corporation Complete 
Privatization  
  National Textbook Co. 
12 Subsidiaries including Korea 
Telecom Card Co. and Hanyang 
Wood Co. 
  
 
  
  
Korea Telecom 
Korea Tobacco and Ginseng 
Corporation 
Korea Gas Corporation 
Daehan Oil Pipeline Corporation Gradual 
Privatization  
  Korea District Heating Corporation 
28 Subsidiaries including Korea 
Telecom Powerel Co. 
 Korea LNG Co., and Korea Power 
Engineering Co. 
  
  
  
  
Agricultrual & Fishery Marketing 
Corporation 
Korea Coal Corporation 
Korea Highway Corporation 
Korea Land Corporation 
Korea National Housing Corporation 
Korea National Oil Corporation 
Korea Resources Corporation 
       
Restructuring  
  
  
  
  
  
  
6 Subsidiaries 
including  
Korea Telecom 
Freetel Co.  
and Korea Nuclear 
Fuel Co. 
  
  
  
Korea Security Printing and Minting 
Corporation 
Korea National Tourist Organization 
Korea Trade and Investment Promotion 
Agency 
Korea Water Resources Corporation 
Rural Development Corporation Restructuring  
  Korea Appraisal Board 
Liquidation or 
Merger 
  
  
  
  
  
8 Subsidiaries 
including  
Hanyang 
Corporation and 
Korea Real Estate 
Trust Co. 
  
  
  
Source: Korea Ministry of Planning & Budget 
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As shown in Table 4, the 1998 plan classified public enterprises into three groups and 
prescribed different solutions for each of them.  The first group is the set of public enterprises 
to be privatized, including POSCO, Korea Heavy, Korea Chemical, KTB, and Korea 
Textbook, along with 12 subsidiaries of various GOCs and GICs.   For this group, pubic 
enterprises were to turn their shares over to private hands to allow the new owners to operate 
them based upon profit incentives. 44 
The second group consists of the public enterprises that eventually need to be privatized, but 
would not be privatized in the short-term.  It included KT, KT&G, KEPCO, KOGAS, Daehan 
Oil Pipeline, and Korea District Heating, as well as 28 subsidiaries of GOCs and GICs.  For 
this group, a gradual privatization approach was proposed.  The GOCs and GICs belonging 
to the second group were all monopolistic firms in network industries, except for KT&G.  
Privatization of monopolistic public enterprises in the network industries requires a wide 
range of changes in regulatory and industrial policies. 
The third group is the set of the public enterprises that would not be privatized.  For this 
group, privatization was not considered as an option.  It was only for internal restructuring or 
liquidation.45 
c. Lessons:  The 1998 Privatization Act   is an ambitious plan for Korea to privatize 
most government owned enterprises.  It could have been more aggressive if the government 
fully adopted the privatization plan by Il Chong Nam, the architect of the whole plan.  
According to Dr. Nam’s perspective, the scope of privatization is substantially greater than is 
commonly believed and consumers would benefit directly or indirectly from appropriately 
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designed privatization schemes in most commercially oriented SOEs.  In the remaining 
industries, notably gas, electricity, transportation, telecommunication and other utility 
industry, it is necessary for the government to implement appropriate regulation such as RPI-
X method when privatizing them.  
2.3.2. Case Study: Korea Telecom (KT) 
A. General Background 
Korea Telecom (KT), a monopoly in network industry, has successfully completed the 
privatization in 2002 that was designed in 1994.   
B. Review of Deregulation Process 
a. In the 1980s:  KT had a monopoly power in the international, domestic long-distance, 
and local exchange markets as well as in the mobile telephone market by the end of 1980s.  
Since public enterprises in Korea are not allowed to pursue commercial objectives and are 
required by law to service public objectives, KT thus was viewed as a tool to execute the 
policies determined by Korea Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC) and not as 
a profit-seeking firm.46 
b. In the Early 1990s:  Divestiture of KT started in 1993. During the 1993-1996 period, 
the government attempted to sell 49 percent of KT shares, but was only able to sell only 28.8 
percent for the domestic investors.  The remaining shares were eventually sold to investors in 
2002. 
In 1991, MIC announced a long-term plan to turn its telephone bushiness into a privatized 
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industry allowing private sector to enter into the international telephone market.  However, 
only one entrant was permitted.  It maintained a duopoly until 1996, and then allowed one 
more entrant in 1996.  In the domestic long-distance market, the government maintained the 
KT monopoly until 1996, when it allowed entry of only one firm, DACOM.  In the mobile 
market, the government allowed only one entrant in 1994 and three others in 1995.  Over five 
years, rates for international calls have been adjusted several times, resulting in decreases in 
both the average rate level and the rate differential for the two operators. 
c. In 1996:  MIC issued new licenses for several service areas.  Two licenses for PCS 
services were granted to two chaebols, Hansol and LG.  The third went to a consortium 
controlled by KT and Freetel.  All three new operators were required to use CDMA 
technology.47 
There are specific restrictions on the ownership of KT shares in addition to the 15 percent 
ceiling for any single party.  First, the Telecommunications Industry Act puts a ceiling on the 
combined ownership in KT by foreign investors at 49 percent.  Second, the Act also forbids a 
foreigner to become the largest shareholder of KT.  The second restriction on the ownership 
of KT was introduced to maintain KT as a Korean firm; however, no such restriction exists 
for SKT or any other telecom operator in Korea. 
C. Characteristic of Korean Deregulation on KT 
First, the government did not open major markets fully to anyone who wanted to participate 
but controlled the number of firms and selected the entrants.  Second, in selecting new 
entrants, the government did not auction off licenses but instead employed complicated 
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scoring systems.  Third and most importantly, MIC has been playing three different and 
conflicting roles: owner of KT, promoter of industrial policies for the telecommunications 
industry and the related equipment manufacturing industry, and regulator of the 
telecommunications industry.  As a consequence, KT has been run as an instrument of 
industrial policy rather than a profit-seeking firm.  Overall, the deregulation of the telephone 
industry in Korea has not promoted the competition successfully. 
D. Implication and Experience of Current Privatization 
Korea’s privatization process was rather slow and the initial results were rather unsatisfactory.  
The main lesson to be learnt of Korea’s experience is that the implementation and completion 
of an appropriate regulatory framework is a precondition for success, as demonstrated by the 
experience of KT deregulation process in the past years. 
- The regulatory framework should consider the changes that occur in the domestic and 
international market. 
- Competition should be promoted and defended, with clear and consistent policies.  
Regulators should consider possible implications when  introducing such a competition, 
including the effects on industrial structure and contracts, cross-subsidies and distributional 
concerns, and uncertainty.  
- The price of services should be established in such a way that efficiency is required 
from the firm.  Allowing the private firm a minimum return does not induce efficiency. 
- The regulatory agency should have the resources, independence and the power to 
impose sanctions to the privatized firm if it does not comply with the contract in terms of the 
quality and quantity of the service provided.  
- There should exist the possibility for consumers to participate in the defense of their 
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interest with enhanced Consumer’s Protection Law. 
- Finally, the regulatory framework should be ready before the actual privatization 
process starts, in order to avoid the mistakes of the first process of privatization. 
The sequence for the privatization process should be as following: 1) Preparation and 
enactment of the regulatory framework; 2) Reorganization of the state-owned firm to make it 
more valuable for the private sector; 3) Actual privatization; and 4) Monitoring, supervision 
and control of compliance of commitments. 
 
2.4. An Overall Evaluation 
2.4.1. Merits of Privatization  
In UK, Japan, and Korea, privatization of SOEs for past 20 years generally brought about the 
following benefits: 1) a free entry and competition; 2) cost and price reduction; 3) improved 
services; 4) increased efficiency and efficient resource allocation, and 5) temporary assets 
sales income to the government (which helps reduce fiscal deficits)48.  Privatization of SOEs 
destroys monopoly or oligopoly in relation to the control and running of their activities.  
Their stocks are sold to the private sector.  Combined with a wide range of deregulation 
measures, free entry produces competition.  Intermediate goods and raw materials relating to 
these public utilities are also influenced by such privatization.  Price mechanism turns to 
work in every domain as costs are reduced. 
Competition also yields better and increased service for consumers.  For example, the 
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privatization of telecommunications in each country has brought about lower telephone 
charges, better services, and increased opportunities to enjoy mobile phone services.  
Furthermore, assets sales of SOEs boosted government revenue that can also be utilized for 
external as well as internal debt repayments.  
2.4.2. Demerits of Privatization  
Demerits of privatization mainly include the following three aspects: 1) Unemployment; b) 
Reduced service in remote areas; and 3) Bad debt problems.  It is well recognized that 
privatization of SOEs produces unemployment.49  If there were no provisions to reallocate 
retrenched workers, unemployment would increase, which may result in serious social 
problem.  Services to remote areas tend to be shut down or cut back as privatized utilities 
often ignores unprofitable areas which were previously subsidized by state-owned 
monopolies.   
Unperforming SOEs generally have huge stranded debts. When these SOEs are privatized, 
the debts owed by the SOEs have to be handled carefully by the government.  For example, 
the problems surrounding the huge debts of the JNR have not yet been solved and remain a 
heavy burden on the national treasury and the people of Japan. 
2.4.3. Lessons and Challenges Ahead 
Promotion of competition and efficiency is the key goal of privatization.  Privatization is not 
only a matter of selling shares of a state-owned industry because transfer of ownership 
doesn’t guarantee the competition.  The underlying issue is to improve industry performance 
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by increasing the role of market force.  To achieve this goal, other instruments and measures 
for promoting competition must also be adopted.  From UK and Korea privatization 
experience, depending on specific conditions, each country’s privatization plan must be part 
of a whole scheme tailored to the particular condition of each industry. 
A. Criteria  
Table 5: Enterprise Conditions50 
 
Country Market           Competitive Market Non-competitive Market 
High capacity to regulate 
the market friendly  
 
  
Sell 
  
  
First ensure  establishment of  appropriate 
regulatory environment; 
then sell 
Consider privatization of management 
arrangement 
Establish appropriate regulatory 
environment; 
Low capacity to regulate the 
market unfriendly 
  
  
Sell, with attention to 
competitive conditions  
  then sell 
Source: Privatization: Principles and Practice, International Financial Corp. 1995 
For the commercially oriented SOEs in a competitive market, basically the government 
should just sell them as soon as possible.  For the natural monopoly industry in a non-
competitive market, it is essential for the government to install appropriate regulatory like 
RPI-X method prior to privatization. 
B. Key Obstacles to Privatization 
The past experiences of privatization illustrated several key obstacles for a country moving 
towards privatization.  
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- Inappropriate design of privatization strategy (in terms of scope, technique, sectors and 
institutional capability of the government) 
- Underdeveloped capital markets 
- Poor preparation of enterprises for privatization or divestiture (such as inadequate 
accounting and auditing, treatment of losses, or social and environmental safety nets) 
- Unclear and weak institutional framework: decentralized (ministerial/ provincial level) or 
centralized (such as an independent privatization committee under the head of state) 
- Insufficient transparency and flexibility in terms of the method of privatization, balancing 
ownership and control (corporate governance) 
- Lack of strong high-level political commitment  
- Lack of appropriate legal frameworks (e.g., property rights, foreign ownership, 
bankruptcy laws) 
It is not surprising that both Japan and Korea experienced a two-stage development process, 
since in the initial stage a sound environment for privatization was not in place.  Relatively 
speaking, the external conditions in UK were superior to those in Japan and in Korea, in 
terms of market economy’s maturity, and capital market development.  
There are some supplementary measures for implementing successful privatization programs 
in other countries:  
a. Provisions to enhance competition and to prevent monopoly  
-Liberalization in new entries, pricing, products 
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-Monitoring device required 
b. Measures to cope with the vested interest groups 
-Persistence from employees: employ share ownership 
-Transparency in the use of revenue from SOE sales 
c. Characteristics of well-designed privatization program: 
-Gradual selling of SOE shares with consideration for the capacity of the securities market 
-Open door policy to foreign investors 
-Avoidance of lump sum sales of SOE shares that may result in low selling price and low 
revenue to the government 
-Various approaches  
C. Necessity of Due Diligence 
The economics of privatization cannot be separated from the economics of competition and 
regulation.  Ownership arrangement has important influence upon the incentives of decision 
makers in firms, but their behavior equally depends upon the stimulus of market forces and 
mechanisms of regulation.  
For the private firms with extensive market power such as a monopoly, efficient profit 
seeking behavior cannot be expected to lead to socially efficient results.  It is imperative for 
privatization to be accompanied by adequate measures to reduce and contain market power.  
Where feasible, the scope of competitive forces should be expanded by the effective removal 
of barriers to entry and by restructuring the dominant enterprise.  
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As the Japan case shows, where monopoly power still remains, the task is to devise 
regulatory mechanisms that encourage internal and allocative efficiency and discourage 
strategic behavior by the firm towards the regulatory authority.  We have seen that NTT with 
monopoly power has been seriously flawed.    The desire to limit the burden on regulators 
has often resulted in limiting the effectiveness of regulation.  RPI-X price regulation has been 
introduced in several industries to hold the fort.  The effectiveness of regulation in the future 
will depend largely upon the capacity of the regulatory bodies nominated by the government.  
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CHAPTER III  
 
IMPLICATION AND SUGGESTION FOR CHINA SOES REFORM 
 
China is a large country in transition, moving from centrally planned economy to market 
oriented economy.  In this context and process, it is expected that privatization will be an 
important policy instrument and objective.  
3.1. Background of China’s SOEs Reform 
3.1.1. Industrial Performance on China’s SOEs  
China has over 100,000 medium and large-scale SOEs, about a third of which are incurring 
losses.  Numerous indicators demonstrate China’s SOEs inefficient management and their 
deteriorating profitability.  Measured by output, the share of SOEs in the Chinese economy 
has declined, from 75 percent in the late 1970s to about 28 percent recently.  However, SOEs 
still account for about 44 percent of urban employment and as much as 70 percent of 
government revenues.  The share of SOEs in deficit is above 43%, and higher than 75%, if 
hidden and repressed deficits are considered.  The ratio of their total deficits and profits has 
been rising in the 1990’s, when the average rate of profits has declined to almost none.  
China SOEs started to make net losses in 1996 and their profit decreased by 42.5% over 1995.  
In 1997, the net losses increased, up to 94.3 billion yuan.  Among the 6,599 large and 
medium sized SOEs, 39.1% of which made losses.  
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Table 6: Shares of State and Non-public Sectors (%) 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, various editions 
 
The above table shows the SOEs’ share of industrial production and employment has been 
declining since 1978.  It also shows the SOEs’ industrial output has declined in relative terms, 
while their investment share did not change very much.  This implies that their investment 
efficiency has been deteriorating. 51 
The Chinese government is fully aware of  the poor performance of SOEs that have hurt 
economic development in many aspects.  In terms of macroeconomic implications, 
channeling of resources into loss-making SOEs for political and social consideration means 
inefficient allocation and certainly constrains the economy’s ability to generate balanced and 
sustainable growth.   
The use of subsidized credit and government transfers to support SOEs is inflationary.   
Policy lending by centrally controlled banks to SOEs creates fiscal burden on the central 
government and thus impedes the government’s ability to fund social security, education, and 
                                                 
 51 Katsuji Nakagane, SOE Reform and Privatization in China, Discussion Paper CIRJE-F-95, 
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State Sector 
Gross Industrial 
Output 
Fixed Capital 
Investment 
Urban  
Employment 
Non-public 
Sector Gross 
Industrial 
Output 
Urban 
Employment 
1978 77.6 n.a. 78.3 n.a. 0.2 
1980 76 81.9 76.2 0.5 0.8 
1985 64.9 66.1 70.2 3.1 3.9 
1990 54.6 66.1 62.3 9.8 5.7 
1995 34 54.4 59 29.4 24.5 
1996 28.5 52.5 56.7 32.1 28 
1998 28.2 54.1 43.8 40 46.7 
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infrastructure.  The Chinese government  is seeking to convert its four giant specialized 
banks into commercial institutions.  These banks control the bulk of banking assets that are 
critical to China’s financial stability.  However, their transition has been a challenging task 
due to the large amounts of policy loans and other non performing loans.  
3.1.2. Performance on China Private Sector 
The private sector is the most dynamic segment of the Chinese domestic economy.  It has 
blossomed into a major contributor to China’s GDP.  By 1998, the domestic private sector 
accounted for 27 percent of GDP, ranking second after SOEs.  Up to 66 percent of industrial 
output came from private sector in 2000.  In addition, more than 1.1 million workers laid off 
from SOEs were absorbed by the private sector.  The impressive development of the private 
sector is in sharp contrast to the stagnation of the SOEs and collective sectors.  Private sector 
has been growing at the rate of 20 percent over the past few years.  In 1999, private sector 
represented two thirds of total industry added value.  In contrast, SOEs has been declining at 
the rate of 15 percent yearly.  
3.2. China Recent Reform on SOEs and Remaining Problems 
3.2.1 Origin of “Three-Year Bail-out SOEs Reform”  
The rapid development of the private sector and its impressive performance in the 1990s has 
been a catalyst for SOEs reform.  Various policies to save and reform SOEs have been 
launched: Corporation Law was enacted; stock markets were opened; and substantial 
financial aids to settle their bad performing loans were provided.  Several types of SOEs 
restructuring programs were also tested to provide them incentives.  However, these 
measures turned out to be ineffective, as the SOEs kept losing their shares further in the 
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market.  SOEs’ financial difficulties became aggravated with millions of their workers laid 
off. Under such situation, a new SOEs reform named  “Three-Year Bail-out SOEs reform” 
was adopted in 1998. which turned to be another  failure in 2001 when the tenure of the 
reform terminated. 
3.2.2. China SOEs Reform and the Outcome 
A. Goal and Content 
Facing the great financial difficulties of SOEs, the Chinese government decided to launch an 
intensive reform on SOEs in 1998.  The agenda was to solve the main problems rooted in 
SOEs within three years.  The main goal of “SOEs reform” is making majority of SOEs 
profitable and successfully establishing modern enterprise system.  The government 
categorized SOEs into three groups:  about 50 percent of them have no future, about 40 
percent could be turned around, and that the remainder, or 10 percent, shows promise.  The 
intended fate for the first group is a managed and gradual exit from the market.  Their bad 
debts are being transferred to four state-approved asset-management companies.  The SOEs 
in the second group are being prepared for sale to foreign or domestic private investors.  
Those in the third group are being listed on the stock markets. 
B. Official Outcome 
In 2001, Chinese government declared that China has basically attained its goal of reforming 
the state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) within three years.  Relevant figures were shown to 
prove that China had successfully stopped the continuous losses and increased the profits of 
SOEs by the end of 2000.  Within three years, China public firm reduced losses by 33.35 
billion yuan.  Official figures show that by the end of 2000, 70 percent of the 6,599 large 
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SOEs in manufacturing with losses reported that they had stopped making losses and began 
to make profits.  The number of money-losing SOEs had been reduced by 4,391, accounting 
for 66.5% of the total 6,599 SOEs in 1997.  Many SOEs had been shut down or put into 
bankruptcy.  Some of the remaining SOEs have become profitable again and the rest of them 
have either been merged or restructured into share-holding companies.   
Specifically, the outcomes of the SOE reform have these aspects:  
a. SOEs Began to Make Net Profit in 2000:  The figures from Ministry of Finance 
indicate that China’s SOEs and state share holding enterprises made a net profit of 283.38 
billion yuan in 2000, an increase of 147.3% than 1999; and 147.8 billion yuan more profits 
than 1994, which is the highest in records.  The total (excluding profits from financial 
institution) is 191,000, of which total assets are 16,006.8 billion yuan, an increase of 10.2% 
over 1999.  
b. A Modern Enterprise System in SOEs has been Established: It has been 
established in 84 percent of the 520 state large and medium-size SOEs.  Debt-to-equity 
swaps were carried out, more enterprises were listed on the stock exchanges and boards of 
supervisors were set up for key large SOEs, promoting transformation in their operating 
mechanism and improvement in their performance.  
c. Taxes were Paid on Time:  In the past, collecting taxes on SOEs were difficult 
because seldom SOEs can make profits.  In 2000, however, evidence from the National 
Taxation Bureau revealed that there were no more tax delays from SOEs.  
d. 13 Million Laid-off Workers were Employed: China’s laid-off workers has totaled 
21 million in the past three years and been reduced by 15 million so far through 
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reemployment process and other means.  
C. Behind the Success Story 
If three-year efforts can successfully improve the poor performance of SOEs without change 
of their ownership, it would be a real success story.  Even though figures shows SOEs made a 
big profit of 283.38 billion yuan, and 70 percent of total 6,599 large and medium SOEs have 
witnessed turning–arounds, it does not necessarily mean they would not relapse into trouble 
again, unless there is a fundamental turn in their competitiveness and innovative capability.  
Moreover, behind the official figures, some facts require further analysis.  
a. The Main Components of SOEs Announced Profits in 2000:  First, most of the 
profits came from policy support by the government.  16 billion yuan of net expenditure on 
SOEs was decreased in 2000 because debt-to-equity swap and time difference between end 
point of interest and declining interest in 1999, which accounts for 12% of the total profits of 
SOEs success.  Increasing the export tax refund increase the total profits around 20 billion 
yuan, i.e. 15 percent of total profits.  Moreover, Chinese government injected 148.66 billion 
yuan to balance SOEs insolvent debts, hence increase the total profits of SOEs in another 
way.  Secondly, external environment also was also favorable.  Because world oil price hiked 
in 2000, China Petroleum and Gasoline Corporation made huge profits, which accounted for 
80 billion yuan or so, representing 60 percent of the total profits of SOEs in 2000.  
Using a rough estimate, the policy and external environment contributed more than 80 
percent of SOEs’ profits in 2000.  In other words, in the recent SOEs reform, privatization 
did not have a significant impact on increasing profits, even through 283.38 billion yuan 
profits was made.  The internal profits-making capability of SOEs did not improve during the 
past three-year reform. 
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b. Huge Losses:  Comparing SOEs to private sector, 32.4 percent of SOEs incurred  
losses by the end of 2000, 13.8 percent point higher than private sector.  Also, some new 
SOEs went to losses while some old SOEs get out of the loss.  Among 3,640 major money-
losing SOEs, 1,469 are among the old money-losing SOEs since 1997; 2,171 are the newly 
money-losing SOEs.  Those newly money-losing SOEs have 70.4 percent of total losses, 
1,602 million yuan on average per enterprise , 61.3 percent higher than old money-losing 
SOEs.  
c. Reliability of the Data and Statistics:  One internal survey by China National Audit 
Office (CNAO) in June 2001 showed that some corporations were found to be violating 
corporate principles and regulation.  False information of assets, liabilities, P&L and 
accounting were found.  About 68 percent of enterprises are found cheating on the 
accounting rules.  Also, dodging bank debts, putting up private treasury and un-standardized 
operation have caused a total 22.8 billion yuan losses of state-owned assets.  The audit also 
found 78 cases of violations with 74 of them handed over to judiciary organs, involving an 
amount of 1.352 billion yuan.52 
d. Corruption:  Corruption of SOEs managers was pervasively spread.  Since lack of 
the property right and external auditing system, the corrupted behavior could not be easily 
controlled and uncovered.  In 2001, the State Discipline Inspection Department retrieved 
economic losses amounting to 3.5 billion yuan.  The Department has received over the past 
year, 10,829 cases, of which 6,07 cases were initially verified; 2,856 cases filed and 1,874 
settled with 2,920 persons given the disciplinary and administrative punishment and 252 
handed over the judicial organs, thereby retrieving a loss of over 2.1 billion yuan.  It has also 
sorted out 1,019 clues of case and 2.31 billion yuan illegal money with 1.41-billion-yuan of 
                                                 
52  CNAO press release on cases SOEs violating laws and regulation, June 2001 
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direct economic loss redeemed through effective supervision. 
D. Main Reasons for Failure  
Chinese SOEs all have the main characteristics and weakness of a public sector, which 
contribute to three main historical sources of the problems for these SOEs: 1) Inefficient 
internal governance systems due to inherent unclear property right; 2) Lack of incentive; and 
(c) Weak monitoring.  The solution to these chronic problems is privatization.  Privatization 
is essential to maintain the dynamics of the shift from centrally planned economy to market 
economy.  It will also help to eliminate inefficiency and waste in the economy and create a 
robust market economy.  
However, the Chinese government has officially refused to implement a broad range of 
privatization policies.  They still adhere to a long held principle of “public ownership as 
basis“.  China’s ideological antagonism against a concept of privatization is fairly strong.  
Due to lack of transfer of property rights, the reform on SOEs is bound to face many 
difficulties. 
a. Unclear Property Right:  Public property clearly belongs to all the people 
represented by the state, as a SOE is, by legal definition, owned by the Chinese people.  
Being owned by 1.3 billion people inevitably means nobody directly owns the firm.  This 
widely dispersed and ambiguous ownership structure induces the excludability problem.  In 
different periods and following the policy shifts, SOEs have been subject to opportunistic 
behaviors and appropriations by those who have direct control of or influence on the firms’ 
assets.  There appropriations may include, for example, asset stripping by managers and other 
insiders; shirking by workers; predatory taxed, fees and bribes levied by government 
officials; and non-pecuniary benefits for employees and their relatives in the form of housing 
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and social services. 
While the 1.3 billion people have no way to exercise direct control over SOEs, the real 
control rights are delegated by the central government to ministries, local governments at 
different levels and their industrial bureaus.  In order to limit the opportunistic behaviors of 
managers and officials at lower levels, the governments at higher levels have to keep tight 
control over SOE operation.  Thus government interventions become inevitable.  
The state has to bear the losses made by SOEs, assuming an unlimited liability for SOEs.  
The asymmetry between lower jurisdictions that are interested in extracting value from the 
SOE pool and higher jurisdictions that replenish value, through either direct subsidies or the 
state bank system, creates a serous moral hazard problem for opportunist local officials.  It 
has induced an accumulation of bad loans and non-performance debt within the SOE sector 
that renders the financial system vulnerable to external shocks and crises. 
b. Lack of Incentive:  Under the traditional centrally planned system, managers 
appointed by the government were in fact government officials; that is, they had no autonomy. 
They could not pursue the business goals of their enterprises.  Although they lacked the 
means by which to improve the operations of their enterprises and to motivate their workers, 
they could not embezzle state enterprise’s profits and property for their political career would 
be in jeopardy.  After the micro-management reforms, the state enterprises gained on 
increasing amount of autonomy.  Because of lags in the reform of the macro policy 
environment, the information costs of checking on managerial discretion are still 
prohibitively high.  Consequently, the more autonomy the state delegates to state enterprises, 
the greater will be the motives and the more abundant will be the opportunities of managers 
and state enterprises workers to cheat state profits and property. 
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In China, enterprise reforms were carried out without matching reforms to the macro-policy 
environment.  There was no mechanism by which to objectively appraise the performances of 
enterprises and managers.  As policy induced losses or profits continued to exist, the 
profitability of an enterprise cannot accurately reflect its performance.  It is very easy for 
loss-making enterprises and their managers to shirk responsibility and escape punishment, 
while profit-making enterprises are not necessarily efficient, nor are their managers’ efforts.  
Thus, operational efficiency and profit level are not good bases for rewards.   
As managers are not punished or rewarded effectively, they are not willing to increase their 
income by aligning their interests with those of the state.  On the contrary, they try in every 
way possible to increase the share of profits retailed by their enterprises, and to embezzle 
state property in order to maximize their personal income.  As the autonomy of enterprises 
increases, the difference between the interests of managers and owners grow more 
pronounced, and managers become less disciplined.  Not only is there no increase in the 
state’s benefits, but the state’s property is embezzled as well. 
c. Weak Monitoring:  The corporate governance is arguably the worst problem in 
Chinese public sector.  Agency problem is very serious in public sector.  In China’s SOEs, 
the agency problems are further aggravated by the conflicting roles assigned to the managers 
and to the supervising bodies, and by the fact that SOEs assets are akin to public goods that 
suffer from free-riding problems.  
On the other hand, private firms are much less affected by these problems.  Monitoring costs 
are lower, and thanks to their close relationships, information can be easily shared by the 
member firms within the community.  Furthermore, incentives can be aligned more easily 
because of member firm’s common interests and the fact the private firms share financial 
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risks. 
3.2.3. Financial Sector Reform and Outcome 
A. Recent Financial Reform Process 
The government has launched a series of financial reform programs since the 1990s. 
Financial reforms included a commercialization of specialized banks, a reduction of direct 
lending typically known as a “credit plan”, a separation between policy and commercial 
lending activities, a re-capitalization of banks, and entry and interest deregulations. In spite 
of these reforms, the financial sector has remained dominated by the wholly state-owned 
commercial banks (WSCBs) and intervened heavily by the government till today. 53 
As of 2001, the Chinese banking system consists of the four WSCBs, 3 policy lending banks, 
more than 100 commercial banks, about 3,000 urban credit cooperatives (UCCs), and about 
42,000 regional credit cooperatives (RCCs), and about 160 foreign banks with branches or 
representative offices. 
With respect to the financial sector restructuring, the following methods have been 
implemented: 1) Recapitalization; 2) Conversion of debt into equity; 3) Mergers, 4) Disposal 
of non-performing loans (NPLs), and 5) Closure and bankruptcy of insolvent financial 
institutions. 54 
As for the first measure, the government made a capital injection of 270 billion yuan ($32 
billion) to the WSCBs in 1998 by issuing bonds.  On the second measure, the Chinese 
                                                 
53 Shirai, Sayuri Assessment of China’s Financial Reforms, Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and The Pacific, ESCAP-ADB Joint Workshop on Mobilizing Domestic Finance for 
Development, 2001:4 
54 Sayuri Shirai, Assessment of China’s Financial Reforms, Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and The Pacific, ESCAP-ADB Joint Workshop on Mobilizing Domestic Finance for 
Development 2001:7 
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government arranged a debt-equity swap of about 5 billion yuan in 1996 for Everbright Trust 
and Investment Company, since it could not meet its maturing debts.  As a third measure, 
more than 2,000 UCCs were merged into 88 city commercial banks during 1995-1998 in 
accordance with the assessment of assets and capital, write-off of some bad debts, and 
encouragement of new shareholders.  As a fourth measure, fours asset management 
companies (AMCs) were established in 1999 to acquire and dispose NPLs of the WSCBs.  
This suggests that 1.4 trillion yuan of assets has been transferred from the four WSCBs to the 
AMCs.  As a fifth measure, the Hainan Development Bank and three TICs became highly 
insolvent and thus were closed in 1997-1998. In 1998, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) 
closed Guangdong International Trust and Investment Company that incurred heavy losses 
and could not meet maturing debts.  
B. Outcome of Financial Reform 
Even the government exercised great efforts, the above financial reforms have remained 
largely marginal, and have not produced noticeable impacts on improving the performance of 
the WSCBs.  Their profitability, capital adequacy, and loan loss provisions have remained 
low.  Paid-in capital of the WSCBs declined relative to bank assets from 12.1% at the end of 
1985 to 2.2% at the end of 1997.  Their net worth declined rapidly from 13.2% in 1985 to 
2.7% in 1997.  Even though NPL of 1.4 trillion yuan were transferred to the AMCs, the four 
WSCBs still hold 25% of NPL. 55 If proper accounting methods were applied, all WSCBs 
would have found to face a negative net worth and thus would have been categorized s 
insolvent. 
                                                 
55 Sayuri Shirai, Assessment of China’s Financial Reforms, Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and The Pacific, ESCAP-ADB Joint Workshop on Mobilizing Domestic Finance for Development, 
2001: 8. 
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C. Main Reason of Poor Reform Outcome 
China’s financial reform process in some sense is quite similar to Korea reform experience.  
First, the government waited long time before enacting necessary legislation supporting 
financial market development.  It was not until 1995, 17 years after China’s reform and 
opening, that appropriate central bank laws were put in place.  Commercial bank legislation 
also waited until 1995.  This has resulted in state-owned banks remaining dependent on the 
government and government policy.  Second, the banking system has not developed in a 
manner that promotes efficient payment and fund allocation mechanisms.  High savings are 
not fully effective in driving economic growth, due to the weak channels and lack of 
incentives for interregional mobilization of capital.  Third, financial liberalization has 
proceeded too slowly.  This is evident from the government’s using a regressive banking 
sector to maintain tight control over many aspects of business and economic decision-making.  
This leads to market distortions and to unexpected policy shifts as the government finds 
savings flows and investment decisions not working in accord with policy directives.  Finally, 
interest rates have failed to assume the flexible role they play in advanced capitalist countries.  
The government continues to manipulate the interest paid on government securities, to satisfy 
investors who face only limited alternative outlets for investible funds. 
However, the key obstacle to the implementation of drastic financial reforms arises from the 
problems of their borrowersthe poor and deteriorating performance of the SOEs.  As 
discussed earlier, a growing number of SOEs have experienced a substantial decline in 
profits in the 1990s in spite of overall economic growth.  This has not only caused a rapid 
deterioration of WSCBs’s loan assets, but also has limited credit available to private firms by 
absorbing more than 75% of bank loans, which deterring the private sector’ investment 
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growth.  The poor performance of the SOEs is attributable to a number of factors.56  The 
above-mentioned characteristic features of Chinese SOEs have produced problems 
unanticipated by the reform’s framers, like stripping, decapitalization, wage manipulation 
and tax evasion.  These problems undermined severely the performance of the banking sector.  
 
3.3. Solution and Suggestions to Chinese SOEs 
3.3.1. Solution for Chinese SOEs: Privatization 
Reforms in SOEs including the banking sector are critical to China’s long term economic 
growth prospects.  China’s entry into the WTO in December 2001 will expose the enterprises 
to international competition, makes these reforms even more urgent, and no less daunting.  
The suitable solution for poor performing Chinese SOEs is privatization. Private ownership 
is a necessary condition for strengthening the corporate adaptive capabilities when facing 
changes in the environment.  Privatization is expected to make it easier for a government to 
promote competition.  Reforming SOEs further would mean restructuring them into 
shareholding companies fully responsible for their own financial operations, using more 
market-based labor practices, and improving corporate governance.57 
3.3.2.  Suggestions for Privatizing Chinese SOEs 
A. Implement Comprehensive Privatization Program 
The first suggestion for China is to develop an overall privatization plan throughout the 
                                                 
56 Sayuri Shirai, Assessment of China’s Financial Reforms, Economic and Social Commission for 
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57 Song, Dae Hee, Public Enterprise Management Reform and Its Privatization, Korea Institute of 
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country.  Even as China attempted several reforms to improve SOEs performance, 
commercialization, rather than privatization has been the main agenda of large SOE reform.  
Property rights of the strategically important sectors are still firmly kept in the state hands.  
There is no real privatization plan yet.  However, as stated earlier, without transfer of 
property right, privatization effort is unlikely to improve the efficiency and performance of 
large SOEs.  The outcome of the recent reforms clearly supports this point. 
B. Establish Clear Property Rights 
Defining and clarifying clear property right is the premise to carry out an entire privatization 
successfully.  China’s SOEs reform has been carried out without any substantial development 
on ownership of enterprises.  Ambiguity in property rights is one of the key obstacles to 
further market evolution and the privatization process.  Clarifying property rights as well as 
changing property structure is certainly a tough task, for socialist economies with a lot of 
people of vested interest in public property in particular.  However, until clarification of 
property rights, the privatization cannot be possible because this right cannot be really 
transferred and tradable. 
C. Follow General Rules of Privatization 
As a former pure planned economy, China’s SOEs dominant the whole economy and the 
structure, unlike others countries like UK, Japan and Korea. There are large SOEs that 
represent to certain extent public interests in China.  There are also remains a large number 
of middle and small SOEs, which are not related to the policy oriented issues at all.  The 
scope of privatization can therefore be wider and more complicated than other countries.  To 
distinguish different inherent features of these SOEs is very important, indeed a prerequisite 
before promulgation of privatization plan, that should be tailored in any case to China’s own 
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situation.  
The Chinese government should formulate different policy targets on various types of SOEs.  
It is our view that the vast majority of state owned enterprises in China should be privatized 
for the sake of efficiency and better industrial performance except selected industries like 
national defense.  This of course does not preclude the government to play a stronger role for 
some SOEs even after their privatization while others SOEs can be simply sold out.  For the 
small and medium SOEs, which are not related to the policy considerations, one can simply 
privatize them as soon as possible.  For large SOEs, it is desirable to conduct a short-term 
and long-term privatization plan separately.  For those public utilities, the government should 
privatize them as well but with the effective regulatory framework as UK and Japan did.  
D. Utilize RPI-X Regulation for Natural Monopoly Privatization 
Regulation is critical to the successful privatization of natural monopolies.  As China has a 
large number of inefficient utilities in monopoly situation, how to successful regulate those 
industries will be a key issue.  Price cap regulation will be a suggested method to apply in 
this case. 
Price cap regulation (RPI – X regulation) has become a popular and rather successful form of 
regulation in many utilities industries in several countries.  It originated from UK, and later 
widely applied in many other countries’ privatization process.  Since 1989, price caps have 
also been used in the United States to adjust the prices charged by the long-distance 
telephone company AT&T.  Most state governments now employ some form of price cap 
regulation to govern the intrastate activities of their telecommunications suppliers.  In New 
Zealand, a price cap is used to adjust Telecom New Zealand’s rental charge for a residential 
phone line. Price caps are also used in some developing countries.  Malaysia, Mexico, and 
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Peru, for example, use them for telecommunications, and Argentina uses them for gas and 
electricity as well. 
E. Choose the Right Time and Speed 
Results of privatization and deregulation are affected by business cycles.  During the 
economic expansion period, dismissal of SOE employees is relatively easy without creating  
serious social problems because redundant workers can be relocated or absorbed in a 
growing economy.  Moreover, SOE stocks and real estate can be sold at a higher price.  
However, the opposite happens during a recession.  Thus, the timing of the introduction of 
these policies is of utmost importance, especially when SOEs have heavy debt burdens. 
Hasty liberalization can create turmoil.  The speed of deregulation is hence another issue to 
be considered, particularly when markets are not ready for opening-up.  Such a situation 
developed in Korea during Asia financial crisis.  Hence, the speed, sequence, and timing of 
liberalization are important factors that must be considered.  Furthermore, monitoring 
systems to guard against unexpected turmoil, for example, monitoring institutions, or at least 
information disclosures, for short-term capital movements in the case of global money 
markets, are urgently required.  
F. Promote Active External Investors 
There is a necessity to promote active investors in the capital of newly corporatized SOEs.  
Active investors could be domestic or foreign financial institutions, enterprises, individuals 
who are committed to monitoring and to being involved actively in the restructuring of newly 
corporatized SOEs through a minority stake in the capital of these enterprises.  This is to 
counter-balance the effects of an “insider” control that has been getting stronger in these 
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countries.  This is particularly important for large SOEs, which are to be corporatized but 
will probably remain under State control.   
It would be helpful if the government could inform these enterprises of future privatization 
plan in the further reform process, in order to reinforce the new signals the government is 
sending out to them.  These enterprises should progressively familiarize themselves with a 
control carried out by financial markets.  In this context, there is a need to continue to 
implement new reforms concerning the legal system especially to protect the rights of 
minority shareholders (but who could be active), to allow a good functioning of the board of 
directors, to put pressure on these enterprises to have a better disclosure of their financial 
situation and a better transparency on their operation.  Still the state could also keep some 
“golden shares” in the capital of large SOEs operating in some strategic sectors 
(infrastructure, military) which give the government the possibility to put its veto in an 
operation like the transfer of control to a foreign company. 
3.3.3. Suggestion for Chinese Financial Sector Reform 
The Chinese government is aware that the privatization of the WSCBs is a key to successful 
financial reform; however, it is held back by political obstacles.  To make all the policies 
successful, it is better and essential for the government to adopt the following comprehensive 
measures suggested by ADB.58 
First, it has to clean up and restructure and balance sheets of WSCBs before they become 
public.  In this process, the government must strengthen the capital base of these banks 
through a further recapitalization and a promotion of financial bond issuance.  However, the 
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absence of secondary markets for credit and collateral and inadequate property rights makes 
it extremely difficulty to transfer, sell the securities or assets of WSCBs, since the market 
price of the assets can hardly be realized and the ratio of realized asset values to book values 
is extremely low.  Thus, improving a legal and institutional environment is essential to fulfill 
this goal.  Moreover, the government should ensure that the AMCs with the skills and 
incentives to discharge their responsibilities and would ensure that their financial positions 
are soundly based (IMF 2000).  
Second, the government needs to adopt global standards on accounting, auditing, and 
disclosure requirements, particularly with respect to potential listed banks.  The government 
already tightened prudential regulation in 1998 and 2000; however, existing accounting 
principles appear to be largely problematic, especially as to the calculation of maturities of 
interest receivable and the principle of provisioning for NPL.  Also, financial institutions 
should supply reliable, transparent business records, which make it easier for mergers, 
restructuring or closure of any financial 59  institutions.  In other word, promoting 
standardization of information regarding financial institutions as well as enterprises is a 
prerequisite not only for a successful restructuring of the WSCBs and other financial 
institutions, but also for fostering sound capital markets. 
Third, the WSCBs should be promoted to become more commercial-oriented and risk-
conscious through reforming their corporate governance structure in accordance with the 
provisions of the corporate law and the law of commercial banks.  This policy is essential not 
only to limit a further accumulation of NPL, but also to prepare for the fuller-scale entry of 
foreign banks that will take place within the next 5 years after the accession to the WTO.  A 
further liberalization of interest rate is also a crucial step to improve banks’ risk management 
                                                 
59 Johnson, Christopher, Privatization and Ownership, Lloyds Bank Annual Review, 1988:131 
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skills. 
Finally, and most importantly, more comprehensive SOE reforms must be undertaken with a 
further emphasis on ownership diversification, liquidation, mergers, and closure.  Without 
fundamental resolution of the SOEs, the likelihood that the WSCBs become viable, solvent 
financial institutions is small.  The prolonged maintenance of problematic WSCBs would 
eventually undermine China’s economic growth through limiting a further expansion of 
private sector. 
In a nutshell, the government should undertake more comprehensive and drastic steps for 
restructuring WSCBs.  At the same time, further deregulations-properly-sequenced interest 
rate deregulations, and expansion of the scope of business, further entry deregulations for 
new banks that are well-capitalized and technologically-advanced should be adopted in order 
for the OCBs to become more viable and commercial-oriented.  Moreover, the very poor 
performance of policy lending banks indicates a strong and urgent need for actions that 
would enable them to operate in a sustainable manner. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
On the basis of a theoretical review, this paper examined the primary rationale and 
experience of privatization process in UK, Japan and Korea.  From three country surveys and 
various case studies, several lessons were drawn for China, the largest developing economy 
in transition with challenging privatization process ahead. 
In Chapter I, this paper analyzed the economic rationale for the privatization in explaining 
why property right matters in economical efficiency.  It also clarified that under perfect 
market situation the privatization can simply promote the efficiency, while under imperfect 
market condition the government should promulgate necessary regulation to control the 
privatized monopoly industries.   
In Chapter II, an empirical analysis was undertaken to explore the institutional linkage in 
selected countries: UK, Japan and Korea.  Empirical studies have documented the dramatic 
growth of privatizations globally and the resultant efficiency gains.  It concentrated on the 
economic aspects of the process, especially with reference to regulating methods. In case 
studies, the focus was on how the privatization could play a crucial role in improving 
efficiency and welfare.  It also stressed that the economics of privatization cannot be 
separated from the economics of competition and regulation.  Ownership arrangement has an 
important influence upon the incentives of decision makers in firms, but their behavior 
depends equally upon the stimulus of market forces and mechanisms of regulation.  
In Chapter III, this paper analyzed the relative failure of China’s recent SOE reforms and 
identified three typical diseases in the public enterprises which were discussed in Chapter I: 
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(i) Inherent unclear property right; (ii) Lack of incentive; and (iii) Weak monitoring.  It is 
suggested that, the small and medium SOEs, which are not related to the policy 
considerations, could be simply privatized as soon as possible.  For large SOEs, it is desirable 
to conduct a short-term and long-term privatization plan separately.  For those public utilities, 
the government should privatize them as well but with the effective regulatory framework as 
UK and Japan did.  
In conclusion, both theoretical analysis and empirical evidence support the view that private 
ownership is most efficient and hence privatization is most suitable in markets where 
effective competition prevails. China, though a socialist economy in transition, is no 
exception. 
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